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WHY CREDITORS FILE SO FEW INVOLUNTARY
PETITIONS AND WHY THE NUMBER IS NOT TOO
SMALL
Susan Block-Lieb*
With its enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781
Congress abolished the "acts of bankruptcy ' 2 as the standard for
commencement of involuntary bankruptcy cases, and replaced it
with the "general failure to pay" test.3 It adopted the "general
failure to pay" standard at the suggestion of the Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws, in part, because it was viewed as an easier
standard for creditors to prove. By liberalizing the standard,
Congress hoped to encourage creditors to file involuntary peti-
tions against a debtor before the situation becomes "hopeless"
and "the assets are largely depleted."' Despite this change in the
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Many, many
thanks are due to friends and colleagues who commented on prior drafts of this article,
including Terrence Blackburn, John Gibbons, Carol Goforth, Pat Hobbs, Dick Lieb, Pe-
ter Lieb, Catherine MacAuliff, Richard Mendales, Mike Risinger, Charles Sullivan, Bill
Whitford, Barry Zaretsky and Mike Zimmer. I profited immensely from the collabora-
tion. The imprecisions and mistakes that remain are my own.
1 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1329 (1988)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, is commonly
referred to as the "Code," or the "Bankruptcy Code," and I have adopted these refer-
ences here.
I See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 3a, 30 Stat. 544, 546 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 21(a) (amended 1938) (repealed 1978)). In contrast to the common reference to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, as the "Code," the former Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, as amended, is commonly referred to as the "Act" or the "Bankruptcy Act" or
the "former Act," and I have followed this common usage.
I See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1). The "general failure to pay" stan-
dard is not the only standard for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case
under the Code, however. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2) (permitting commencement of case
upon appointment of custodian of, or custodian's possession of, a substantial portion of
debtor's assets).
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was established by
Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). For a description of the Commission and its
work, see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuPTcy LAws OF THE UNITED STATES,
ILR Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at v-xix (1973), reprinted in LAwRENcE P.
KING ET AL. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy App. vol. 2 (15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter "Concs-
SION REPORT"].
5 COUMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
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applicable standard for commencement of an involuntary case,
the vast majority of bankruptcy petitions are, as they histori-
cally have been, brought voluntarily by debtors rather than in-
voluntarily by creditors.6
Of course, these statistics do not present a clear picture of
the extent to which debtors are coerced into bankruptcy. The
line between voluntary and involuntary filings is an ambiguous
one because debtors often file voluntary petitions in reaction to
creditors' collection efforts. 7 A voluntary filing triggers the auto-
matic stay and stops creditors from coercing repayment on de-
linquent debts.8 Eligibility for voluntary filing is a snap to estab-
lish,9 and there are tactical advantages to controlling the time
and place of the filing. By filing a voluntary petition, the debtor
can control the venue of the case and most of the proceedings
litigated with the case.10 The debtor can time the filing either to
preserve or lose the ability to avoid pre-petition preferential and
other transfers, depending upon whether the debtor wants to in-
sulate a particular transferee from avoidance liability.1" It can
time the filing either to preserve or lose employees' limited pri-
ority for wages relating to services rendered within the statuto-
rily prescribed pre-petition period, for example, by filing after
6 Statistics show that during the 10-year period since the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the ratio of involuntary petitions to the total number of petitions has actu-
ally decreased by several times. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, BANKRUPTCY STATISTICAL TABLES TWELVE MONTH PERIODS ENDED JUNE 30 (1970-
88). This ratio may be misleading. Between 1978 and 1988, the number of involuntary
bankruptcies filed per year has averaged nearly 300 more filings than the period from
1970 to 1978, however, during that same time span, the average number of all bankrupt-
cies filed per year has increased by over 180,000 as compared to the period before the
1978 Code. The impact of the legislative changes to the standard for commencement of
involuntary cases is most evident in involuntary reorganization cases. The average num-
ber of involuntary reorganization petitions filed since 1978 is more than 14 times the
average number for the preceding period and is effectively responsible for the increase in
the total number of involuntary filings. See Appendix A to this article.
See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL.. As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 21-23 (1989).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
9 Id. § 109.
10 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988). See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shop-
ping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 818 (1987) (com-
plaining that pursuit of the Code's distributional advantages causes debtors to engage in
this "troublesome forum shopping"); Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dy-
namics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311, 353-54 (argu-
ing that geographic concerns explain much about why creditors appear to prefer their
nonbankruptcy collection remedies).
1 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-553.
[Vol. 57: 803
INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS
payday.12 It can time its filing to maximize the amount of unen-
cumbered cash or accounts receivable, or otherwise to put itself
in a favorable position to negotiate with a post-petition lender. 13
Yet despite the creditor's ability to deprive the debtor of
these procedural advantages by striking first, a surprisingly
small number of involuntary petitions are filed each year.1 4 This
article attempts to explain why creditors have not taken up Con-
gress's invitation to file more involuntary petitions against their
debtors, and suggests some possible reforms.
Part I sets the groundwork for this task by contrasting the
current standard for commencement of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy case with its predecessor under the former Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.15 It explains why Congress decided to open up the
standard for commencement of an involuntary case so drasti-
cally in 1978 and notes that, in doing so, it sought to accommo-
date competing interests. On the one hand, Congress was aware
that creditors found the "acts of bankruptcy" too difficult to
prove, and adopted the current "general failure to pay" standard
in an effort to ease these problems of proof. In making the stan-
dard easier for creditors to prove, Congress intended both to
streamline hearings on contested petitions and also to encourage
creditors to file involuntary petitions at an earlier stage in a
debtor's financial troubles, before value is lost. On the other
hand, Congress also was aware that debtors and their creditors
may be able to resolve their financial troubles more quickly and
inexpensively outside of the bankruptcy court. It sought to avoid
interference with these efforts by limiting the negotiating lever-
age this liberal standard might provide to creditors and by en-
couraging the use of state collective remedies.1 "
Part II explains the consistently small number of involun-
tary filings as the inevitable result of these competing interests.
Creditors fie few involuntary petitions because they often prefer
11 See id. § 507(a)(3), (4).
11 See id. §§ 363, 364.
, For example, of the 594,567 petitions filed during the fiscal year ending June 30,
1988, only 1,409 were involuntary petitions. BANKRUPTcY STATLTCAL TABLES, (1988),
supra note 6.
16 Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
16 "State collective remedies" are state laws that provide creditors with a collective
means for the repayment of obligations that are pursued by a debtor's creditors as a




a negotiated resolution of a debtor's financial troubles. This
preference for nonbankruptcy solutions is strongest in the case
of an individual debtor17 but also exists in the case of debtors
that are corporations18 and partnerships. 19 Congress was aware
of these preferences, sought to accommodate them, and has been
successful in its efforts to prevent creditors' use of bankruptcy
to disrupt consensus. Of course, the more that creditors rely on
nonbankruptcy solutions to their debtors' financial troubles, the
fewer creditors' petitions they will file.
To a limited degree, creditors also do not file involuntary
petitions because of difficulties in proving the standard for com-
mencement of an involuntary case. Congress did not entirely re-
solve creditors' evidentiary troubles with its repeal of the "acts
of bankruptcy," since the current standard presents its own ob-
stacles, some of which were created with a 1984 amendment to
the standard.20 The more difficult it is for creditors to establish
the standard for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy
case, the fewer petitions creditors will file. Congress sought to
make this standard provable with reference to publicly available
data, not simply for improvement's sake, but also because it rea-
soned that creditors' distributions from bankruptcy estates
would increase if creditors' petitions were filed sooner, and cred-
itors' petitions would be filed sooner if the standard were sim-
pler to establish. But in inviting creditors to file involuntary pe-
titions more often, or at least earlier on, Congress forgot what it
already knew: that creditors' reluctance to file involuntary peti-
tions is explained, not only by their problems of proof, but also
by their preference for a negotiated resolution of a debtor's fi-
nancial difficulties. Changing the standard did not alter credi-
tors' preference for nonbankruptcy solutions, it just made things
easier for those creditors who had decided that bankruptcy
made sense for them.
Part III proposes reforms to the standard for commence-
'7 The Code does not explicitly define the term "individual" but consistently uses
the term to mean a natural person or human being. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) ("person"
defined to "includef] individual, partnership, and corporation").
"- Id. § 101(8) (definition of "corporation").
" Although the Code does not expressly define the term "partnership," it incorpo-
rates the state law definitions and concepts. See, e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1), 6
U.L.A. 22 (1969 & Supp. 1991).
"0 See text accompanying notes 230-34 infra.
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ment of an involuntary bankruptcy case. These changes would
make the standard provable with evidence readily available to
creditors. Because the Code adequately accommodates creditors'
strong interests in noncoercive collection efforts, these proposals
should not have an enormous impact on the frequency of invol-
untary bankruptcy petitions. Although involuntary bankruptcy
can be made a more effective creditors' remedy, it probably can-
not be made the remedy to which creditors first turn.
I. CHANGES TO THE STANDARDS FOR COMMENCEMENT OF AN
INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY CASE: CONGRESS'S MIXED
MESSAGES
Under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898,21 as amended in
1938,22 three petitioning creditors23 whose provable claims,24
21 For a history of involuntary bankruptcy under the various Bankruptcy Acts en-
acted and repealed prior to 1898, see, e.g., CHAR.ES WARREN. BANKRtwm IN UNIrm
STATES HISTORY (1935); John C. McCoid, Occasion for Bankruptcy, 61 AL BANFnm LJ.
195, 196-212 (1987).
1 While there were numerous amendments made to the Bankruptcy Act, the mast
important and far-reaching amendments were made by the Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575,
52 Stat. 840 (1938), commonly known as the Chandler Act. For a complete description of
this legislative history, see 1 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL. COLLIm ON BANKRUPTCY tl 0.00-
0.10, at 2-28.1 (14th ed. 1974).
1 If the debtor had fewer than 12 creditors, then an involuntary petition could have
been commenced under the Act by a single creditor holding a provable claim of -500 or
more. Act § 59b (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 95(b) (repealed 1978)). See note 24 infra for the
discussion of the term "provable, claim" under the Act. Complex rules governed the com-
putation of the number of a debtor's creditors for purposes of determining whether three
creditors were required to join in the petition. See Act § 59e (codified at 11 U.S.C. §
99(e) (repealed 1978)). For example, fully secured creditors, employees and relatives of
the "bankrupt" were excluded from the count of creditors. See 2 LAWRENCE P, KING &r
AL. COLLIER ON BANKRuPrCY 303.06, at 303-14 (15th ed. 1989). In addition, courts may
have excluded de minimis claims from the count of a debtor's creditors. Compare
Denham v. Shellman Grain Elevator, Inc., 444 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1971) (de minimis
claims excluded) with Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Okamoto (In re
Okamoto), 491 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1974) (de minimis claims included). Excluded creditors
did not necessarily lack standing to join in an involuntary petition, however. See 2 COL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra, T 303.06, at 303-14.
24 Act § 63a (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (repealed 1978)) (defining "provable
claim"). For a general discussion of the concept of a "provable claim," see, e.g., JAmEs A.
MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTcY § 40, at 33, §§ 139-149, at 124-44
(1956) ("There [were] nine separate classes of provable claims listed in the statute, but
the general effect is that tort claims, except those reduced to judgment, and except those
for negligence in litigation at the filing of the bankruptcy petition, are excluded, but
other claims are usually provable."). The term "provable claim" has no continuing rele-
vance under the current Bankruptcy Code.
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fixed as to liability and liquidated as to amount, aggregated $500
or more in excess of the value of liens held by them,25 could file
an involuntary petition against an eligible2" debtor. If the
debtor contested the filing, petitioning creditors were required
to show that the debtor had committed an "act of bankruptcy '28
within four months prior to the filing of the petition" before the
debtor would be adjudicated a bankrupt and a Chapter VII liq-
uidation case3 0 would be commenced.31 An involuntary reorgani-
20 Thus, the Act permitted secured creditors to join in an involuntary petition. How-
ever, because the $500 threshold referred only to unencumbered claims, fully secured
creditors were less likely than unsecured or undersecured creditors to have joined in an
involuntary petition. Secured creditors also did not face the same incentives to com-
mence an involuntary case since permitted the remedy of self-help repossession and
commercially reasonable sale of collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1988).
" Certain types of debtors were not amenable to involuntary liquidation or reorgan-
ization under the Act: farmers, wage earners, unincorporated companies, and corpora-
tions that were not moneyed. Act § 4b (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 22 (repealed 1978)). The
term "wage earner" was defined as an individual earning wages or salary not exceeding
$1,500 per year. Act § 1(32) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1(32)) (repealed 1978). Otherwise,
any person who was eligible for voluntary relief under the Chapter under which the peti-
tion had been filed could be forced into a similar proceeding by the filing of an involun-
tary petition. Thus a building and loan association, municipal railroad, insurance com-
pany or bank were not amenable to an involuntary filing because ineligible for voluntary
relief. See MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 36, at 27-28. Short of these narrow exclusions,
however, all persons were eligible to file a voluntary petition under the Act and adjtidica-
tion of the debtor as a bankrupt generally followed as a matter of course. See id. § 49, at
39-40.
27 The Act generally referred to a "debtor" as a "bankrupt," but this terminology
was removed with Congress's enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code in an effort to
diminish the stigma associated with bankruptcy.
28 See Act § 3a (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)) (repealed 1978). See text accompany-
ing notes 37-42 infra.
29 The Act imposed complex tests to determine when each of the various acts of
bankruptcy had occurred: the third act (failure to vacate lien by legal proceedings of
distraint) was said to occur on the date the lien was obtained; the first and fourth acts
(concealment or fraudulent transfer of property, and general assignment for benefit of
creditors) occurred when the transfer or assignment was perfected against bona fide pur-
chasers; and the second act (preferential transfer) occurred when the transfer was per-
fected in accordance with the tests set forth in the preference provision. Act § 3b (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. § 21(b)) (repealed 1978). See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22,
VS 3.701-.707, at 522-32; MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 61, at 51-54.
20 Under the Bankruptcy Act liquidation cases were governed by Chapters I to VII
of the Act. A liquidation case under Chapter VII of the Act should be distinguished from
a reorganization case commenced under Chapters X, XI, XII or XIII of the Act.
3' The filing of an involuntary petition was distinct from the adjudication of the
debtor as a bankrupt. See MACLACHLAN,'supra note 24, § 49, at 39-40. The petition
merely created the potential for the commencement of a case; an order adjudicating a
debtor as a bankrupt actually commenced the bankruptcy proceeding, and the entry of
this order generally did not occur until after a hearing on the contested involuntary peti-
[Vol. 57: 803
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zation case could also be commenced under Chapter X (but no
other reorganization chapter) of the Act32 against a corporate
debtor that was insolvent or unable to pay its debts as they ma-
tured, but only if petitioning creditors established that (i) the
debtor had committed an "act of bankruptcy, ' 33 (ii) a receiver or
trustee, or indenture trustee or mortgagee under a mortgage,
had taken possession of the greater portion of the debtor's prop-
erty,34 (iii) a proceeding to foreclose a lien against the greater
portion of the property of the debtor had been brought,33 or (iv)
the debtor had been adjudged a bankrupt in a case pending
under another Chapter of the Act.36
The 1898 Act identified six different "acts of bankruptcy":
(a) fraudulent transfers under Section 67 or 70 of the Act (concerning
avoidance of certain statutory liens and other fraudulent transfers); 17
(b) preferential transfers under Section 60a of the Act;"
(c) the failure to vacate a judicial lien in a timely manner, within the
later of 30 days after imposition of the lien or 5 days before a sched-
uled judicial sale, if the debtor was insolvent during this period;30
(d) making a state law assignment for the benefit of creditors;"°
tion. Technically, the filing of a voluntary petition under the Act also was distinct from
the adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt. A court's adjudication of a voluntary
debtor as a bankrupt was a mere formality, however, for there were far fewer grounds on
which a voluntary petition could have been contested. The present Bankruptcy Code no
longer refers to debtors as "bankrupts." See note 27 supra. It, thus, also does not adjudi-
cate a debtor as a "bankrupt." Instead, the Code distinguishes between the filing of a
petition and the entry of an order for relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 301.
-" Chapter X provided limited reorganization relief under the Bankruptcy Act. See,
e.g., MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 310, at 372.
" See Act § 131(5) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 531(5) (repealed 1978)). See also id. § 3a
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (repealed 1978)) (acts of bankruptcy defined).
See id. § 131(2), (3) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 531(2), (3) (repealed 1978)).
See id. § 131(4) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 531(4) (repealed 1978)).
See id. § 131(1) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 531(1) (repealed 1978)).
37 For a general discussion of the elements of Act §§ 67 & 70, see, e.g., 4B COLaR
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, I 67, 70; MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, §§ 221-246, 282-
287. For a discussion of case law interpreting the first "act of bankruptcy," see 1 COLru
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, 1i 3.101-.109.
"For a general discussion of the elements of Act § 60a, see 3 Cotl ON BANK-
RUPTCY, Pt. 2, supra note 22, 1 60.07-.35; MAcLACHMA, supra note 24, §§ 247-277. For a
discussion of case law interpreting the second "act of bankruptcy," see 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, 1 3.201-.208.
11 For a general discussion of the state law remedies of attachment, garnishment,
execution and levy, see STEFAN A. RiESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDrrORS'
REMEDIES AND DETRs' PROTECTION chs. 1-3 (4th ed. 1987).
"I For a general discussion of the state law collective insolvency remedy of assign-
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(e) the appointment under state law of a receiver of property when
the debtor was insolvent or unable to pay its debts; 41 and
(f) the admission in writing of an inability to pay debts and a willing-
ness to be adjudicated bankrupt.2
Although it was widely assumed by practitioners, courts and
commentators alike that only an insolvent 43 debtor could be
thrust into bankruptcy involuntarily, 44 the debtor's solvency was
a defense only to an involuntary petition grounded on the first
act of bankruptcy (concealment or fraudulent transfer).4 This
ment for the benefit of creditors, see DOUGLAS J. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 1289-1301 (1990); LAWRENCE P. KING &
MICHAEL L. COOK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, DEBTORS' PROTECTIONS AND BANKRUPTCY 580-91
(2d ed. 1989); RIESENFELD, supra note 39, at 430-41; Robert A. Greenfield, Alternatives
to Bankruptcy for the Business Debtor, 51 LA. B.J. 135 (1975).
' For a general discussion of the state law collective insolvency remedy of receiver-
ship, see, e.g., KING & COOK, supra note 40, at 599-604; RIESENFELD, supra note 39, at
443-54.
42 MacLachlan criticized this sixth "act of bankruptcy" as "so close to voluntary
bankruptcy as to be of minor importance" because it required proof not only of the
debtor's written admission of its inability to pay debts, but also of its willingness to be
adjudicated a bankrupt. MACLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 58, at 49. See also 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, 1 3.601-.609, at 509-22. Despite this criticism, MacLachlan
advocated the retention of this sixth "act of bankruptcy." MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24,
§67, at 58.
43 "Insolvency" was defined under the Bankruptcy Act by providing that "a person
shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act whenever the aggregate of his
property, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed,
or removed, or permitted to be concealed, removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or
delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts."
Act § 1(19) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (repealed 1978)).
" Compare H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 323 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N., 5963, 6279-80 (mistakenly stating that the Act "requir[ed] [proof of] bal-
ance sheet insolvency and an act of bankruptcy") (emphasis added) with S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5820 (correctly
stating that: "Proof of the commission of an act of bankruptcy has frequently required a
showing that the debtor was insolvent on a 'balance-sheet' test when the act was com-
mitted.") See also MACLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 15, at 11-12 (noting that this assump.
tion was generally correct as a practical matter).
"I Prior to its amendment in 1938, Act § 3c provided that: "It shall be a complete
defense to any proceedings in bankruptcy instituted under the first subdivision of this
section to allege and prove that the party proceeded against was not insolvent as defined
in this Act at the time of the filing of the petition against him . .. ." (emphasis added).
In West Co. v. Lea, 174 U.S. 590 (1899), the Supreme Court interpreted the underscored
phrase as permitting a bankrupt to raise its solvency as a defense to an involuntary
petition only when the petition had alleged the first "act of bankruptcy." In 1938 Con-
gress codified this ruling by substituting "under the first act of bankruptcy" for the am-
biguous underscored phrase. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §3, 52 Stat. 840, 845. See 1
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, § 3.109[1], at 430 n.2; Israel Treiman, Acts of
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misconception arose because, although petitioning creditors were
required to prove, as a prerequisite to bringing a bankruptcy
case against the debtor's wishes, that the debtor had committed
an act of bankruptcy rather than that the debtor was insolvent,
many of the acts of bankruptcy implicitly required a showing of
the debtor's insolvency as an element of their proof. Thus, if pe-
titioning creditors relied on the first act of bankruptcy and al-
leged the debtor's commission of a constructive (rather than ac-
tual) fraudulent transfer,46 they may have been required to
prove the debtor's insolvency at the time of the alleged fraudu-
lent transfer. Creditors were also required to prove insolvency as
an element of the second and fifth acts of bankruptcy (preferen-
tial transfer 47 and appointment of receiver48 ). As a practical
matter then, proof of an act of bankruptcy often required proof
of the debtor's insolvency.
There were several problems of proof associated with estab-
lishing a debtor's insolvency as that term was defined under the
Act. First, petitioning creditors found that a debtor's "insol-
vency" was difficult to establish because it "describe[d] a purely
internal condition, the existence of which [could] be legally as-
certained only through a comprehensive examination of the
debtor's entire financial condition. '49 In addition, the Act's defi-
nition of the term was vague. 50 While clearly the term required a
comparison of the debtor's assets and liabilities to determine
whether the asset side of this balance sheet was less valuable
than the liability side, the definition did not specify how this
was to be done. It provided only that a debtor's assets should be
Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Low, 52 HARv. L. Ry. 189,
197-210 (1938).
4 See Act § 67d (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (repealed 1978)) (insolvency among
possible elements of constructive fraudulent transfer).
"I Compare Act § 60 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96 (repealed 1978)) (requiring proof
that transferee had reasonable cause to know of debtor's insolvency) with Code, 11
U.S.C. § 547(f) (debtor rebuttably presumed insolvent within 90 days preceding filing of
petition for purposes of preference provision).
"' After a 1938 amendment to the fifth "act of bankruptcy," however, petitioning
creditors could have commenced an involuntary case against a debtor whose property
was in the possession of a receiver when the debtor was either insolvent or in general
default. Ch. 575, § 3, 52 Stat. 840, 844-45 (1938). See 1 COLLIER ON BAN RUPTvcy, supra
note 22, § 3.505[1], at 504.
• Treiman, supra note 45, at 211.
'o See Act § 1(19) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (repealed 1978)).
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measured "at a fair valuation."'" Thus, attempts to determine a
"fair valuation" of a debtor's assets involved resolution of theo-
retical questions surrounding the conditions of the liquidation;
differences in the assumptions about the circumstances of the
hypothetical liquidation substantially altered the appraiser's
conclusions about the value of tlje debtor's assets. And "no ade-
quate theories of valuation ha[d] been developed or applied." 2
The Act's definition of insolvency also was ambiguous in that it
appeared to invite courts to assign a theoretical value to the
debtor's assets rather than to ascertain the assets' actual liqui-
dation value.5 3 Nor did the Act unambiguously define what
property was to be included in calculating the value of the "ag-
gregate of the debtor's property. '54 Finally, the Act required the
1 Id.
82 See MACLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 15, at 12. See also JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, VALU-
ATION OF PROPERTY (1937) (generally describing difference between liquidation and go-
ing-concern valuation of debtor's assets); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Valu-
ation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1063-94 (1985) (same).
1 See MACLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 16, at 13; James C. Bonbright & Charles Pick-
ett, Valuation to Determine Solvency Under the Bankruptcy Act, 29 COLUM. L. REV.
582, 594-603 (1929) (generally describing difference between liquidation value and going-
concern value, and lamenting that courts interpreted Act definition of insolvency to re-
quire determination of "intrinsic" or "real" valuation of debtor's property "which is
neither its liquidation value or its value to the going business"). In this regard the Act's
definition of insolvency differed from that of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA). See UFCA § 2(1), 7A U.L.A. 442 (1985) ("A person is insolvent when the pre-
sent fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay
his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured."). See
also MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 16, at 13 (distinguishing definition of insolvency
under former Act with that under UFCA). MacLachlan noted that the bankruptcy
definition:
[D]emands a fair valuation of the debtor's assets (as distinguished from fair
saleable valuation) thus inviting a theoretical consideration of what the assets
ought to bring, quite apart from what they will bring. The reference in the
Uniform Act to fair saleable value, instead of simply to fair value or to saleable
value, suggests a consideration of what the assets might actually bring, under
normal conditions and times.
Id.
5, Act § 1(19) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (repealed 1978)) (excluding from asset
side of balance sheet only assets transferred to debtor with actual fraudulent intent). See
Bonbright & Pickett, supra note 53, at 589-93, 606-18 (noting that, perhaps because the
statute only expressly excluded property that had been conveyed by debtor prior to
bankruptcy with intent to defraud creditors, many courts included exempt assets in cal-
culation of balance sheet insolvency under the Act, and were undecided on inclusion of
good will and similar intangible assets). But see UFCA § 1, 7A U.L.A. 430 (1985) (defini-
tion of "assets" excludes fraudulently transferred and exempt property). See also Code,
11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (definition of insolvency excludes fraudulently transferred and ex-
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court to determine whether this theoretical value of assets was
insufficient in amount to pay the debtor's obligations, and thus
to assign values to the debtor's contingent and unliquidated
liabilities s. 5
Because of these ambiguities, trials on contested involun-
tary petitions often dragged on for long periods of time at con-
siderable expense to petitioning creditors and others. Not only
was insolvency extremely difficult to prove, but the determina-
tions as to whether the debtor had committed an act of bank-
ruptcy and whether it was insolvent were questions of fact on
which the debtor was entitled to a jury trial. 8 As a result of this
lengthy gap between the filing of the involuntary petition and
either the adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt or the dis-
missal of the petition, a business debtor and its creditors stood
to suffer substantial disruption to the business, as well as a dim-
inution to the value of the estate that often occurred during the
period after the filing of the petition and before the conclusion
of the trial contesting the filing.5 7
The legal community nearly uniformly criticized the "acts
empt assets); Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. 644 (1985)
(definition of "assets" excludes exempt, encumbered and certain entireties property).
15 According to MacLachlan: "This means that a debtor who has slow assets which
cannot be liquidated at a theoretically fair valuation may be immune from involuntary
bankruptcy until his situation deteriorates greatly." MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 15, at
12. For this reason, MacLachlan preferred the UFCA definition of insolvency because it
"seems to involve some of the elements of bankruptcy insolvency and some of the ele-
ments of ordinary or equity insolvency" in that it asks whether the present fair saleable
value of the debtor's assets is "less than the amount that will be required to pay his
probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured." Id. § 16,
at 13 (emphasis added).
50 See Act § 19a (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 42(a) (repealed 1978)) (providing bankrupt
with absolute right, upon timely demand, to trial by jury on questions of (i) insolvency
and (ii) occurrence of alleged "act of bankruptcy").
5" Under the Act, creditors who transferred property to the debtor after an involun-
tary petition had been filed and before the debtor's adjudication as a bankrupt were
provided only limited protection. Creditors who were aware of the petition were pro-
tected only if they could prove that they had reasonable cause to believe that the peti-
tion was ill-founded. Act § 70d(3) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(3) (repealed 1978)). See
4B COLLIER ON BAmKUPTCY, supra note 22, T 70.68, at 743-62; CoMMIssIoN REPor,
supra note 4, pt. I, at 190. Furthermore, this limited protection existed under the Act
only after amendments made in 1938 with enactment of the Chandler Act. Id. See note
22 supra. Debtors also may have been entitled to some remedy for the improper filing of
an involuntary petition under the Act. See Act § 69b (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)
(repealed 1978)); FED. P. BANKL P. 115(e), 411 U.S. 1003 (1973). See also 4 Coy T i ON
BANKRupTcy, supra note 22, 69.05; COMIuSSION R'PoRT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 80.
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of bankruptcy"58 as an anachronism that impeded the smooth
workings of the modern credit economy"0 either by delaying res-
olution of a contested involuntary petition"1 or by deterring
creditors from bringing an involuntary case.62 Several eminent
bankruptcy scholars called for reform in this area, proposing
that the standard for commencement of an involuntary case be
liberalized to encourage creditor filings. 3 While diverse in their
19 Compare James W. Moore & Philip W. Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amend-
ments: Improvements or Retrogression?, 57 YALE L.J. 683, 708-10 (1948) with, e.g., 1
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, 1.19[1], at 98-103; MAcLACHLAN, supra note
24, §§ 52, 65; Asa S. Herzog, Bankruptcy Tomorrow, 45 Am. BANKR. L.J. 57, 59-60 (1971);
Reuben G. Hunt, National Bankruptcy Legislation - Past, Present and Future, 8
J.N.A. REP. BANKR. 13, 20 (1933); A.B. Kreft, What Is the "Subject of Bankruptcies'?, 6
TEMP. L.Q. 141 (1932); Treiman, supra note 45; Israel Treiman, Escaping Creditors in
the Middle Ages, 48 LAW Q. REV. 230 (1927); Weinstein et al. Suggestions for Revision of
Bankruptcy Act and Comments Thereon, 8 AM. BANKR. REV. 388, 394-95 (1932); Note,
"Acts of Bankruptcy" in Perspective, 67 HARv. L. REV. 500 (1954). See also REPORT OF
THE STUDY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY LEGISLATION IN CANADA § 3.2.019,
at 106-07 (1970) (recommending, under Canadian bankruptcy law, abandonment of con-
cept of acts of bankruptcy) [hereafter "CANADA STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT"]. For criti-
cism leveled at the specifics of the statutory language, see James A. MacLachlan, As-
pects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy. Act, 4 U. CI. L. REv. 369, 373
(1937). For a historical discussion of criticism of the "acts of bankruptcy," see McCoid,
supra note 21, at 210-12.
"' Treiman traced the origins of "acts of bankruptcy" as the standard for com-
mencement of an involuntary case and the conceptual change of this standard over time.
See Treiman, supra note 45, at 192-210, and Treiman, supra note 58, at 230-37.
0 The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States used the term
"open credit economy" to refer "to the role of private credit generally in the economy of
the country." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 68. It contended that an impor-
tant goal of the federal bankruptcy laws is to support the "open credit economy" and
that it did so in part by "improving the administration of creditors' rights laws." Id,
See also, e.g., MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 14, at 10 ("Next to a sound currency,
the sine qua non for business confidence, the framers of the United States Constitution
recognized the need for the establishment of sound conditions for the extension of pri-
vate credit. To this end the provision which made bankruptcy a federal matter was in-
cluded in the Constitution [e.g., the Bankruptcy Clause]."); Kreft, supra note 58, at 145
("[T]he main purpose of bankruptcy legislation is the protection of credit, between the
time the debtor is insolvent, or has committed an act of bankruptcy and the time he
makes an adjustment with his creditors, or comes into court."); LoPucki, supra note 10,
at 315 ("The state remedies/bankruptcy system exists to facilitate the lending of
money.").
6' See, e.g., MACLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 65; Treiman, supra note 45, at 211-15.
82 See Treiman, supra note 45, at 211-12 (implicitly arguing that creditors are more
likely to have access to information of debtor's failure to pay current debts, than of
debtor's balance sheet insolvency).
63 For example, MacLachlan proposed that the debtor's inability to pay debts as
they mature "be the ultimate controlling fact" in determining the propriety of an invol-
untary petition, but also that the fourth and sixth acts of bankruptcy be retained. He
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specifics, these scholars generally suggested that American bank-
ruptcy law should be brought in line with the laws of the Com-
monwealth and civil law countries.6 4 They proposed that a stan-
dard permitting the institution of an involuntary case when a
debtor was unable to pay its current obligations be substituted
for the "acts of bankruptcy." 5 Others more broadly proposed
improvements to the definition of the term "insolvent.""ao
In 1973 the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws recommended
in its report to Congress that the area of involuntary bankruptcy
be reformed so that "[t]he concept of 'an act of bankruptcy' be
abolished and the debtor be made amenable to involuntary pro-
also proposed that the third and fifth acts of bankruptcy, as well as absconding or a
general stoppage of payments by the debtor, should constitute prima facie evidence of
the debtor's inability to pay debts. See MlAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, §§ 62-71. Treiman
argued that balance sheet insolvency describes an internal financial condition ascertaina-
ble only after comprehensive review of the debtor's books and records, and valuation of
the debtor's assets and liabilities, whereas equitable insolvency-inability to pay current
obligations-is both an internal financial condition and its external manifestation, and
contended that the acts of bankruptcy should be replaced with a debtor's equitable in-
solvency for these practical problems of proof. Treiman, supra note 45. He also sug-
gested that "a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, unsatisfied liens obtained
through legal proceedings, receiverships, recent admissions of inability to pay debts, and
similar conduct or events," as well as "excess of liabilities over assets," be presumptive of
the debtor's equitable insolvency. Id. at 211-15.
" See, e.g., MAlcLACHLAN, supra note 24, §§ 62-71 (numerous references to English,
Canadian, Scottish and French bankruptcy law); Treiman, supra note 45, at 211-12
(same). See also John Honsberger, Failure to Pay One's Debts Generally As They Be-
come Due: The Experience of France and Canada, 54 A. BNcn. L-J. 153 (1980).
6' Treiman favored an "inability to pay" standard for the commencement of invol-
untary bankruptcy cases and suggested various conduct and events that should presump-
tively indicate a debtor's equitable insolvency. Treiman, supra note 45, at 211-15. Mac-
Lachlan similarly argued that an "inability to pay" standard should govern, but also
would have retained several "acts of bankruptcy" as appropriate bases for commence-
ment of an involuntary case. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, §§ 13-17, at 62-71. See also
note 63 supra. The Canadian study appeared to follow the lead of Treiman and Mac-
Lachlan when it concluded that a "debtor's inability to pay" should be the standard for
commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case, rather than "acts of bankruptcy" or
balance sheet insolvency, but also recommended the retention of a number of conclusive
and rebuttable presumptions of a debtor's "inability to pay." CANADA StuDy Coumrrm
REPoRT, supra note 58, at 105-06. Earlier commentators had argued that the "acts of
bankruptcy" should be replaced with an insolvency standard, however. See Kreft, supra
note 58, at 153.
" Bonbright and Pickett proposed a new standard of insolvency that resembled the
equitable definition of insolvency: "[A] person is insolvent who cannot fairly be expected,
if left to his own devices, to pay off his debts (including not only existing debts but also
those debts he may incur to pay off existing debts) within a reasonable period of time."
Bonbright & Pickett, supra note 53, at 621-22. See generally McCoid, supra note 21, at
209 (discussing scholarly criticism of balance sheet definition of insolvency).
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ceedings when he has [generally] ceased to pay his debts or will
be generally unable to pay his current liabilities. 87 The primary
reason for the Commission's recommendation that the "concept
of an act of bankruptcy be abolished" was a practical one:
It is time to abandon the complex, litigation-producing constraints
and substitute the test of inability or failure to pay debts as the basis
for initiating involuntary bankruptcy. Creditors have a very real stake
in a debtor's assets; state and federal laws recognize this stake and
allow unpaid creditors to reach assets before and after judgment, al-
though the ability to do so before judgment has been restricted re-
cently by considerations of due process. It is better policy to accom-
modate a proceeding for the benefit of all creditors under the federal
legislation than to require individual creditor action which only bene-
fits the aggressive creditor.68
The Commission sought to encourage creditors to bring an invol-
untary case by changing the standard for commencement from
the "acts of bankruptcy" to the "general failure to pay" stan-
dard, in part because they understood that creditors were more
likely to have access to the sorts of information necessary to
prove the debtor's general default than the debtor's insolvency,
which often was an element of the debtor's act of bankruptcy."9
They accepted the view that a debtor's general default is an ex-
ternal event, that the debtor's insolvency is an internal financial
condition, and that an external event is more readily determina-
ble by creditors than an internal condition. 0 In addition, the
Commission viewed a liberal standard for bringing an involun-
tary case as good policy because it encourages creditors to file an
involuntary petition at an earlier stage in the debtor's financial
difficulty-early enough either to rehabilitate the debtor's busi-
ness, or to prevent the debtor from becoming "more insolvent"
as a result of the continued devaluation of its assets. 71 In doing
so the Commission hoped to increase dividends distributed to
87 COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 15. See also id. pt. II, at 74-76 (Pro-
posed § 4-205(c)(1) & (2)).
Id. pt. I, at 188.
69 See id. pt. I, at 14, 188. See also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 44, at 321-24,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6277-81; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 44, at 34,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5820.
10 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 186-87. See also McCoid, supra
note 21, at 211.
" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 14, 186-88.
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creditors in bankruptcy cases, which had been abysmally low.72
Although Congress did not incorporate all of the Commis-
sion's suggestions on this topic 3 when it enacted the Bank-
12 Id. at 14, 186. The statistics to which the Commission referred had actually been
accumulated in 1932. See SoLicrrOR GENERAL THACHER'S REPORT TO THE PRESmENT ON
THE BANKRUPTCY AcT AND ITS ADMINISTRATION IN THE COURTS OF TIlE UNTED STATES 69-
72 (1932) [hereinafter "Thacher Report"]; CO MIMISSION REFORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at
186-87 nn. 31-36 (containing references to the Thacher Report). Although the Thacher
Report concluded that alternatives to liquidation, rather than a change to the standard
for commencement of an involuntary case, would remedy the problem of small dividends
to creditors in bankruptcy, the Commission did not believe that increased dividends to
creditors adequately could be accomplished simply by encouraging debtors to file reor-
ganization, rather than liquidation, cases. The Commission reasoned that:
Although alternatives to liquidation are desirable, they did not and will not,
without further reform, increase the return to creditors. The only substantial
chance of an improvement in this respect is to encourage and facilitate earlier
resort to relief [by creditors].
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 187.
73 With regard to involuntary bankruptcy, the Commission had recommended that-
(1) The concept of "an act of bankruptcy" be abolished and the debtor be
made amenable to involuntary proceedings when he has ceased to pay his
debts or will be generally unable to pay his current liabilities.
(2) A debtor be protected against the risks of ill-founded petitions by requir-
ing the court to hold a hearing immediately after the filing of an involun-
tary petition to determine whether the relief sought is in the best interests
of the debtor and its creditors.
(3) A general assignment or general receivership continue to be a basis for in-
voluntary proceedings without regard to whether the debtor was insolvent
or unable to pay his debts at the time of the filing of the petition, on the
premise that such a disposition or proceeding contemplates a liquidation
and that creditors be able to require it to be conducted subject to the safe-
guards provided by the Bankruptcy Act.
(4) There be no jury trial of any issue raised on an involuntary petition.
(5) A creditor or creditors who have aggregate claims of $2,500 be able to file
an involuntary petition for liquidation of the debtor, and one or more cred-
itors having claims of $10,000 or more be able to file a petition seeking
reorganization of the debtor.
(6) The estate be protected against the risk of depletion and deterioration of
assets pending a determination of the issues on an involuntary petition by
allowing the Bankruptcy Administration with court approval to take im-
mediate possession to preserve the property during the interim before de-
termination of the issues on the petition.
(7) During the interim between the filing of the petition and the determination
of the issues thereon, persons dealing with the debtor in the ordinary
course of his business be protected by being allowed to retain money or
property acquired and to have claims against the estate for credit ex-
tended, and the Bankruptcy Administration be authorized to give express
approval to specific transactions pending the resolution of the issues on the
petition.
(8) The exclusion of corporations other than those that are moneyed, business,
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ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, it removed the "acts of bankruptcy"
as the standard for commencement of an involuntary case and
replaced it with a standard that considered, among other things,
the debtor's general failure to pay its debts as they came due.74
As the law currently exists, 5 three creditors 6 holding
claims" that are neither contingent 8 nor the subject of a bona
or commercial from amenability to involuntary proceedings be eliminated,
as well as the meaningless "wage earner" exclusion.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 15.
7' 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1).
7' Section 303 of the Code was amended in 1984 as a part of the omnibus substan-
tive and jurisdictional amendments that .Congress made at that time. See Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 353
(1984) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766) (commonly referred to as "BAFJA"). See also
Susan Block-Lieb, Using Legislative History to Interpret Bankruptcy Statutes, in
BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 2-1, 2-8 (Alan N. Resnick ed., 1987) (general dis.
cussion of legislative history of 1984 Amendments).
Like many of the 1984 amendments to the Code, there is virtually no legislative
history to explain the need for, or meaning of, the changes made to section 303. But the
history relating to this provision is particularly sparse. The only legislative discussion of
the provision are several paragraphs of unilluminating remarks made by the proponent
of the provision which appear in the Congressional Record for the day on which the
Senate passed its omnibus bill for House approval. See 130 CONG. REC. S.7618 (June 19,
1984) (remarks of Sen. Baucus). Unlike all other substantive amendments made in
BAFJA, the amendments to section 303 were explicitly intended by Congress to apply to
pending cases and proceedings. Compare BAFJA § 553(b) with BAFJA § 553(a) & (c).
Ironically, this special favor appears not to have benefitted the party for whom it was
intended. See Rubin v.-Belo Broadcasting Corp. (In re Rubin), 769 F.2d 611 (9th Cir.
1985).
7' But see 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) (permitting single creditor to file involuntary peti-
tion when debtor has fewer than 12 creditors; in counting debtor's creditors for this pur-
pose, employees, insiders and creditors whose claims are voidable are excluded). See
also, e.g., Blackmon v. Runyan (In re Runyan), 832 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1987) (creditors
holding $600-$800 claims counted in determining whether involuntary debtor has fewer
than 12 creditors; court found it unnecessary to decide if Denham v. Shellman Grain
Elevator, Inc., 444 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1971), was good law since $600 claim not de
minimis); Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank v. Rassi (In re Rassi), 701 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.
1983) (declining to follow Denham, court held that bona fide, small, recurring claims
must be included in § 303(b) count). But see, e.g., In re Smith, 123 B.R. 423 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Denham with approval); In re Hill, 5 B.R. 79 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1980) (same). For a general discussion of the intricacies of counting a debtor's creditors
for purposes of § 303(b), see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, 1 303.07[l[b], at
303-19 to -21, & 303.08112], at 303-41 to -45. For a discussion of whether small claims
should be counted in determining the number of the debtor's creditors, see id.,
303.08[12][d], at 303-44 to -45.
- 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (broad definition of "claim"). Although there exists no explicit
requirement that a petitioning creditor have exhausted its state collection remedies as a
prerequisite to commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case, courts are divided on
this issue. Compare, e.g., In re Win-Sum Sports, Inc., 14 B.R. 389, 392-93 (Bankr. D.
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fide dispute,79 and that aggregate more than $5,00080 more than
the value of any lien81 on the debtor's encumbered property, can
file an involuntary petition-either a petition for a chapter 7 liq-
uidation or a chapter 11 reorganization 82 -against an eligible
Conn. 1981) (exhaustion not required) with, e.g., In re F.R.P. Indus., Inc., 73 B.R. 309
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) (petition dismissed as having been filed in bad faith, where
debtor appeared solvent, petitioning creditors did not first pursue state collection reme-
dies, and creditor's true motive in filing was to effectuate takeover of debtor); In re
Dwoskin, 24 B.R. 41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (involuntary petition dismissed where sole
creditor of debtor would not be prejudiced by pursuit of state collection remedies); In re
R.V. Seating, Inc., 8 B.R. 663 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (same). See also LoPucki, supra
note 10, at 352.
7'8 Although the Code does not explicitly define the term "contingent," courts have
generally agreed on its meaning. See, e.g., In re Caucus Distribs., Inc., 83 B.R. 921, 928
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) ("It is well settled that a contingent claim is one which is depen-
dent on some future event for liability to attach."). Accord, e.g., Semel v. Dill (In re
Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 1984). This limitation on petitioning creditors' standing
probably derives from the requirement under the Act that petitioning creditors' claims
have been provable, although the concept of provable claims no longer exists under the
Code. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, 1 303.08[111[a], at 303-32 to -33
("When the duty to pay a claim does not rest upon the occurrence of a future event, the
claim is not contingent Moreover, a claim is not contingent merely because the debtor
disputes the creditor's claim and has asserted a counterclaim against it"). See also 11
U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (definition of "claim" includes, inter alia, right to payment of dis-
puted amount).
79 Since 1984 petitioning creditors have been required by statute to show that their
claims were not "the subject of a bona fide dispute." 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). See note 75
supra.
11 By increasing the aggregate dollar value of petitioning creditors' claims from $500
to $5,000, Congress only generally followed the Commission's recommendation. The
Commission had recommended that the dollar thresholds be increased but had suggested
that the figure be $2,500 for an involuntary liquidation case and $10,000 for an involun-
tary reorganization case. Congress did not adopt this two-tiered approach and increased
the monetary requirement by an amount between the two figures suggested by the Com-
mission. See COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 4, at 15, 185. See also note 73 supra (Com-
mission's suggestions).
81 Nothing in section 303 precludes a fully secured creditor from joining in an invol-
untary petition. See Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47 (3d Cir.
1988) (fully secured creditor entitled to join in involuntary bankruptcy petition); In re
Crabtree, 32 B.R. 837 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (same). But see Pleas Doyle & Assocs. v.
James Plaza Joint Venture (In re James Plaza Joint Venture), 67 B.R. 445 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1986) (fully secured creditors not entitled to commence involuntary bankruptcy
case). Nonetheless, fully secured creditors probably have less incentive to force their
debtor into bankruptcy than do undersecured or unsecured ones. See note 25 supra.
82 Involuntary chapter 12 and 13 cases are not permitted under the Code. See, e.g.,
Foster v. Heikamp (In re Foster), 670 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating in dicta that
involuntary chapter 13 case would not be permissible). See also 1 COLLw-E ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 23, 303.03. Chapter 12 involves the debt adjustment of a family
farmer. 11 U.S.C. § 109(0. See also 11 U.S.C. § 101(18). Chapter 13 involves the debts
adjustment of an individual with a regular income. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). See also 11 U.S.C.
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debtor.8 3 The debtor is entitled to contest an involuntary peti-
tion within twenty days of the filing.8 4 If the petition is timely
controverted, the court must determine whether to enter an or-
der for relief commencing the case or to sustain the debtor's ob-
jections to the petition." Among other grounds,8 a debtor can
argue that an insufficient number of creditors joined in the peti-
tion (because the debtor has 12 or more creditors), 7 or that one
§ 101(29).
83 With narrow exceptions, section 303(a) of the Code permits the filing of an invol-
untary petition against any debtor eligible for relief under the relevant chapter by the
filing of a voluntary petition: involuntary petitions may not be filed against farmers, fam-
ily farmers, and corporations that are not moneyed, business, or commercial corpora-
tions. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (governing eligibility for relief under each chapter of title 11);
id. § 303(a) (excluding farmers, family farmers, and corporations that are not moneyed,
business, or commercial corporations from amenability to involuntary case). See also 11
U.S.C. § 303(k) ("Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, an involuntary case
may be commenced against a foreign bank that is not engaged in such business in the
United States only under chapter 7 of this title and only if a foreign proceeding concern-
ing such bank is pending.").
Thus Congress did not follow the Commission's recommendation to eliminate the
Act's exclusion of "corporations other than those that are moneyed, business, or com-
mercial from amenability to involuntary proceedings," but did eliminate the Act's "wage
earner" exclusion that the Commission had criticized as "meaningless." COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 15, 186. The Commission had suggested that farmers continue to
be protected against the possibility of an involuntary petition and Congress continued
this exclusion. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 186. The family farmer exclu-
ion was added in 1986 when Congress added chapter 12 to the Bankruptcy Code, which
permits the reorganization of family farmers. The Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 254, 100
Stat. 3088 (1986) (family farmer exclusion codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231).
84 Congress effectively adopted the Commission's recommendation that the court be
required to hold a hearing on a contested petition immediately after the filing. See CoM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 15, 190. Although section 303(h) provides only that a
court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case "[i]f the petition is not
timely controverted," the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure expressly set forth the
time by which an involuntary petition must by contested. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1011 (generally requiring presentation of defenses and objections to involun-
tary petition be filed and served within 20 days after service of the summons); id. Rule
1013 (requiring court to enter order for relief prayed for in involuntary petition as soon
as practicable after expiration of 20-day period referred to in Rule 1011 without filing of
defenses and objections to petition). But see Wynn v. Eriksson (In re Wynn), 889 F.2d
644 (5th Cir. 1989) (two year gap between filing of involuntary petition and entry of
order for relief did not violate requirement of timeliness where delay largely caused by
involuntary debtor's discovery tactics).
85 11 U.S.C. § 303(h).
88 For a more complete list of the grounds for defending against or objecting to an
involuntary petition, see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, § 303.23, at 303-100
to -104.
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (requisite number of petitioning creditors).
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or more of the petitioning creditors does not have standing to
file (because a petitioning creditor's claim is contingent or sub-
ject to a bona fide dispute, or because the aggregate of petition-
ing creditors' claims does not total the requisite $5,000), 88 or
that the standard for the commencement of an involuntary case
has not been established.8 9
If a sufficient number of petitioning creditors have standing,
a bankruptcy court will enter an order for relief commencing an
involuntary case over the debtor's objection upon proof that
"the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such
debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona
fide dispute," 9 or that "within 120 days before the date of the
filing of the petition, a custodian, other than a trustee, receiver
or agent appointed or authorized to take charge of less than sub-
stantially all of the property of the debtor for the purpose of
enforcing a lien against such property, was appointed or took
possession." 91
Under the first and more commonly cited9 2 avenue for
bringing an involuntary case creditors must allege that the
debtor is "generally not paying [its] debts as [they] come due,"
excluding contingent and certain disputed obligations. 3 The
Code does not define this "general failure to pay" standard, and
See id. § 303(b) (standing of petitioning creditors).
See id. § 303(h) (standard for commencement of involuntary case).
Id. § 303(h)(1). The requirement that petitioning creditors show that their debtor
is "generally not paying [its] debts as [they] come due" was amended in 1934 to remove
debts subject to the debtor's bona fide dispute from this determination. This amendment
to the Bankruptcy Code did not accomplish any enormous change to the law, however.
With regard to the standard that petitioning creditors must meet, several courts had
refused to view an involuntary debtor's dispute of its claims as irrelevant, although they
disagreed on the circumstances under which such a dispute would affect the calculation
of a debtor's inability to pay its debts as they came due. Compare In re Covey, 650 F.2d
877 (7th Cir. 1981) (providing for complicated balancing process under which bankruptcy
courts were to determine whether disputed claims were included in calculation of
debtor's general default) with B.D. Int'l Discount Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank NA.
(In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp.), 701 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (declining to
follow Covey, but commenting in dicta that there is "difficulty in believing that.., a
claim qualifies under § 303(h) when the claim is subject to serious dispute"), affg on
other grounds 24 B.R. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983); Semel v.
Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1984) (declining to follow Covey, but instructing
bankruptcy court on remand to balance interests of creditors and debtor in determining
whether to include disputed debt in calculation of debtor's general default).
9 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2).
92 See note 116 infra.
.3 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1).
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courts have found the standard "woefully lacking in clarity." 4
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended to give
courts considerable discretion in making this determination. "
Courts have rejected the contention that the term "generally"
means a majority of the time, and have declined to apply an
invariable mathematical formula;96 instead they have applied a
flexible standard that "look[s] to the totality of the circum-
stances. ' '0 7 In doing so they consider both the number and
amount of unpaid claims98 as of the filing of the petition,"9 and
also may consider other related and unrelated factors'00 such as
9' B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 701 F.2d at 1075.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 75 ("The scope and meaning of generally
unable and generally failed are left to the courts; it is not possible to lay down guidelines
that will fit all cases."). See also B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 701 F.2d at 1075-76.
"6 See, e.g., In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 142 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980),
aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting contention that "to be generally not paying
his debts a debtor would have to be not paying at least 51% of his debts"). See also 2
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, § 303.12[4], at 303-58. Indeed, such a construc-
tion would appear to be foreclosed by a review of the legislative history. See B.D. Int'l
Discount Corp., 701 F.2d at 1075-76 (rejecting similar contention based on review of the
legislative history). See also note 95 supra.
11 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, § 303.12[4], at 303-58. Accord, e.g.,
Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Bishop, Bald-
win, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 779 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1985).
" See, e.g., In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 779 F.2d at
475; B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 701 F.2d at 1076; In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R.
at 142, aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Walnut Street Four, 106 B.R. 56 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1989); Boston Beverage Corp. v. Turner, 81 B.R. 738 (D. Mass. 1987). But see,
e.g., In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 15 B.R. 755, 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (nonpay-
ment of single claim can constitute general nonpayment), afl'd, 24 B.R. 876 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 701 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983);
In re J.B. Lovell Corp., 80 B.R. 254 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987) (same); In re Hill, 5 B.R. 79
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (same); In re Kreindler Import Corp., 4 B.R. 256 (Bankr. D. Md.
1980) (same).
'9 Although the Code is silent, courts uniformly have concluded that the "general
non-payment" standard must be satisfied as of the date of the filing of the involuntary
petition. See, e.g., Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d 1540, 1543 (10th Cir.
1988); In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc. 779 F.2d at 475.
100 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, § 303.1214], at 303-61:
Other criteria which have been examined are: the debtor's ability to meet only
small, periodic debts and not long-term obligations; the fact that the debtor's
assets had declined dramatically and that the reduction in debt was due to the
sale of assets rather than generation of profits; the debtor's liquidity; the
amount of the debtor's debts compared to the amount of the debtor's yearly
income; the fact that insiders deferred payment on account of loans payable to
them; the fact that the debtor voluntarily closed down; the existence of serious
allegations concerning irregularities in the conduct of the debtor's business;
and the apparent lack of good faith by a debtor's officers in taking loans from
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the manner in which the debtor has conducted its financial af-
fairs.10 1 Absent special circumstances,102 the majority of courts
do not find that the debtor's failure to pay a single debt consti-
tutes a failure generally to pay its debts as they come due.103
Since 1984 courts have been directed to exclude debts as to
which the debtor has raised a "bona fide" dispute from the de-
termination of whether the debtor generally is paying its debts
the debtor in spite of the debtor's financial distress.
(citations omitted).
1"1 See, e.g., In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 779 F.2d at
471; In re Covey, 650 F.2d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 1981); Boston Beverage Corp. v. Turner, 81
B.R. 738 (D. Mass. 1987); In re Arriola Energy Corp., 74 B.R. 784 (S.D. Tex. 1987). See
also In re Trans-High Corp., 3 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (interpreting § 303(h)(1)
to mean that order for relief proper when debtor is not paying its debts "in the ordinary
course of busipess"; petition dismissed for failure to establish deviation from ordinary
course).
102 Recognizing the general rule that nonpayment of a single debt does not consti-
tute general default, the bankruptcy court in In re 7H Land & Cattle Co., 6 B.R. 29
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1980), relied on Canadian courts' interpretations of a similar standard
for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case under Canadian law and found
two exceptions: (i) when the debtor has only one creditor and that creditor would other-
wise be without an adequate remedy under either state or federal law; or (ii) when the
petitioner can show special circumstances, such as fraud, trick, artifice or sca. In re 7H
Land & Cattle Co., 6 B.R. at 34 (denying motion to dismiss involuntary petition filed by
single creditor on grounds that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether peti-
tioner had adequate remedy at state law, and as to whether special circumstances war-
ranted commencement of involuntary case). Although many courts have referred to these
ixceptions, "[i]t appears that no court, however, has determined that the granting of an
involuntary petition on the basis of unusual factors alone is proper." In re Caucus Dis-
trib. Inc., 106 B.R. 890, 921 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (dicta). See, e.g., Concrete Pumping
Serv., Inc. v. King Constr. Co. (In re Concrete Pumping Serv., Inc.), 943 F.2d 627 (6th
Cir. 1991); In re Gold Bond Corp., 98 B.R. 128 (Bankr. D.R.L 1989); In re Charon, 94
B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); In re General Trading, Inc., 87 B.R. 216 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1988). See also Bankers Trust Co. BT Serv. Co. v. Nordbrock (In re Nordbrock),
772 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1985) (reference to "special circumstances" doctrine in dicta);
First Florida Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. Smith (In re Smith), 129 B.R. 262 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(same).
103 See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. BT Serv. Co. v. Nordbrock (In re Nordbrock), 772
F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1985). See also Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d
47, 51 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting in dicta that nonpayment of single debt is insufficient
proof of debtor's general default absent "truly extraordinary circumstances"). But see In
re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 15 B.R. 755, 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (nonpayment of
single claim can constitute general nonpayment), affd, 24 B.R. 876 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 701 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 US. 830 (1983);
Concrete Pumping Serv., Inc. v. King Constr. Co. (In re Concrete Pumping Serv., Inc.),
943 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); In re J.B. Lovell Corp., 80 B.R. 254 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1987) (same); In re Karber, 25 B.R. 9, 11 n.1, 14-15 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (same);
In re Hill, 5 B.R. 79 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (same); In re Kreindler Import Corp., 4 B.R.
256 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (same).
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as they come due.104 Although courts have had little difficulty in
defining the "bona fide dispute" standard, 105 this amendment
represents a retreat from Congress's original goal of establishing
a standard dependent only upon external events readily ascer-
tainable by a creditor body in that petitioning creditors may be
required to show that the debtor's dispute of other creditors'
claims is not bona fide.10 6
The Code does not define the term "bona fide" dispute.
Nonetheless, with minor variation, 107 courts have concluded that
debt is subject to a "bona fide" dispute if an objective basis ex-
ists from which to conclude that the debtor's dispute as to the
validity of the debt is supported either by a substantial question
of fact or a meritorious issue of law.0 8 This standard does not
require the bankruptcy court to resolve the dispute, only to
identify its presence or absence. 109 Courts often have concluded
that an obligation is subject to a bona fide dispute when it is the
subject of pending litigation. 1 0 When the debtor is merely dis-
puting the amount of money owed, rather than liability itself,
104 See notes 75 & 79 supra. Petitioning creditors whose debts were disputed by the
debtor would not have been entitled to join in an involuntary petition under the former
Act, since only the holders of provable claims could have joined in a petition and dis-
puted debts were not provable claims.
'o' See text accompanying notes 107-14 infra.
106 See text accompanying notes 230-34 infra.
107 While courts of appeals have agreed on the definition of the term "bona fide"
dispute, bankruptcy court decisions have not been so uniform. Compare In re Johnston
Hawks, Ltd., 49 B.R. 823 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) (applying balancing approach that con-
sidered, inter alia, debtor's subjective good faith in raising dispute) with In re Stroop, 61
B.R. 210 (D. Colo. 1985) (applying same standard as applicable to motion for summary
judgment) and In re Lough, 57 B.R. 993 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (applying standard
ultimately adopted in In re Busick, 831 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1987)). See generally 2 COL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, § 303.8[11][c] at 303-38 to -40.
108 See, e.g., In re Busick, 831 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1987). See also, eg., Rimell v. Mark
Twain Bank (In re Rimell), 946 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1991) (following Busiek); B.D.W.
Assocs., Inc. v. Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 865 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1989) (same);
Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1988) (same).
109 In re Busick, 831 F.2d at 750; Bartmann, 853 F.2d at 1544. Nonetheless, some
courts appear unable to resist the temptation to resolve disputes determined to be with-
out merit. See, e.g., In re Tikijian, 76 B.R. 304 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court found that
debtor's legal defenses to liability on guarantee were without merit); In re B.D.W. As-
socs., Inc., 75 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (that petitioners were owed obligations by
sister corporation of debtor was found not to be indicative of bona fide dispute since
court concluded that corporate veil should be pierced).
"' See, e.g., In re Reid, 107 B.R. 79 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re General Trading,




however, it may be insufficient to support the finding of a bona
fide dispute.-"' Courts also have held that a claim may not be
the subject of a bona fide dispute due to the mere pendency of
the debtor's appeal. 12 Some courts have suggested that a claim
is not subject to a bona fide dispute if the debtor first disputed
the indebtedness after the involuntary petition was filed.113 The
debtor's post-petition payment of the disputed debt will not al-
ways preclude its contention that the debt is subject to a bona
fide dispute.11 4
The second standard for commencing an involuntary
case-involving the appointment of a custodian or the custo-
dian's possession of the debtor's property'l--is less often relied
upon by creditors. 6 The Code defines "custodian" to include a
"receiver, '11 17 "assignee under a general assignment for the bene-
fit of the debtor's creditors," ' as well as a "trustee, receiver or
agent.., appointed or authorized to take charge of property of
"' See, e.g., In re Drexler, 56 B.R. 960 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (debtor's colorable
counterclaims did not preclude finding that claim was not subject to bona fide dispute
since only effect of debtor's success on counterclaims would be to reduce debtor's liabil-
ity to plaintiff).
,12 See, e.g., In re Raymark Indus., Inc., 99 B.R. 298 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (credi-
tors holding stayed judgment against debtor hold claim subject to bona fide dispute;
claims of creditors holding unstayed judgments were not subject to bona fide dispute); In
re Caucus Distrib. Inc., 83 B.R. 921 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (debtor had not obtained
stay pending appeal); In re Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co., 72 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986)
(same); In re Drexler, 56 B.R. 960 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same).
113 See, e.g., In re Taylor, 75 B.R. 682, 684 (Bankr. N.D. IlM 1987) (insufficient evi-
dence of debtor's bona fide dispute when debtor had made single complaint before filing
of involuntary petition and petitioner had made attempts to repair); In re CLE Corp., 59
B.R. 579, 584 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (that debtor had paid petitioning creditors' recur-
ring claims without dispute before involuntary petition was filed tended to indicate that
dispute was not bona fide).
114 See Bartmann, 853 F.2d at 1544.
I' 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2). This ground for the commencement of an involuntary
bankruptcy case combines two of the standards that hd been recommended by the
Commission. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. II, at 74-76 (Proposed § 4-
205(c)).
"I A search for cases citing 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2), conducted in July 1990, produced
only 10 cases. Moreover, in only two of those cases did the petitioners actually rely on §
303(h)(2) as an alternative ground for commencement of the involuntary case. See In re
B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 15 B.R. 755 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 24 B.R. 876 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 701 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
830 (1983); In re North County Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 13 B.R. 393, 400 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1981).
' 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A).
I' Id. § 101(10)(B).
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the debtor" either for purposes of enforcing a lien against the
property or the general administration of the property.1 1 De-
spite the seeming breadth of this definition, 120 courts have lim-
ited its application to instances in which the debtor has given up
both possession and ownership of its property.12 Moreover, sec-
tion 303(h)(2) limits this ground for commencement of an invol-
untary bankruptcy case to instances in which the custodian was
appointed or took possession of all or substantially all of the
debtor's property122 within 120 days before the date of the filing
of the petition.123
In addition to modifying the grounds available to creditors
desiring to file an involuntary petition, Congress also reformed
the law to minimize the costly loss in value that may result from
lengthy contested hearings. First, the Code expedites a contested
involuntary petition hearing by denying debtors the right to a
jury trial on these issues. 124 In addition, it protects against lost
"1 Id. § 101(10)(C). Thus, although it appears to have been derived from the fifth
"act of bankruptcy" under the former Act (appointment of receiver), section 303(h)(2)
also subsumes the fourth "act of bankruptcy" (assignment for benefit of creditors) as
well.
120 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 44, at 310, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6267 (definition of custodian intended to include nonbankruptcy court officials
whose functions are substantially similar to those of receiver or trustee, such as pre-
petition liquidator of debtor's property). Accord S. REP. No. 989, supra note 44, at 23,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5809.
2 See, e.g., In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 15 B.R. at 765 (attorney for debtor not
"custodian" although debtor had turned over all of its cash assets to attorney as escrow
agent); In re North County Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 13 B.R. at 400 (auctioneer hired by
debtor to conduct sale of all of debtor's property and remit proceeds to debtor held not
to be custodian).
"2 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 23, § 303.13, at 303-66 ("Section
303(h)(2) does not contemplate an involuntary case when an appointment of a state
court receiver and foreclosure for less than substantially all of the debtor's real estate
has occurred.").
2I But see id. § 303.13, at 303-65 ("If the creditors wait beyond the 120 day period
they are not precluded from filing an involuntary petition. Creditors are simply relegated
to proving the first ground for relief under section 303(h)(1) rather than the more easily
provable alternative under section 303(h)(2)."). Accord H. REP. No. 595, supra note 44,
at 324, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6280-81; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 44, at
34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5820.
12, See 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (added in 1984). Prior to the 1984 amendments to the judi-
ciary code provisions applicable to bankruptcy cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1480 also explicitly
denied debtors' the right to a trial by jury on the issues presented in a contested involun-
tary petition. The Commission had recommended the elimination of the right to a jury
trial on contested involuntary petitions in its Report. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 4, at 15, 190. In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Granfinanciera, S.A.
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value by encouraging suppliers and others to continue to do bus-
iness with an involuntary debtor pending resolution of a debtor's
objections to a creditors' petition. Creditors who do business
with an involuntary debtor during the "gap" period between the
filing of the involuntary petition and the decision on whether an
order for relief should be entered are accorded a statutory prior-
ity for their claims, second only to the priority of administrative
claims incurred after an order is entered and the case has been
commenced.125
Congress sought to balance competing interests by repealing
the "litigation-producing" acts of bankruptcy as the grounds for
initiating an involuntary case. When it reformed the require-
ments for involuntary bankruptcy, Congress was concerned, not
only with encouraging creditors' petitions, but also with mini-
mizing the leverage that this liberalized standard might create.
It recognized the frequency with which debtors repaid their de-
linquent obligations outside of bankruptcy. It also worried about
abusive creditors unnecessarily pushing debtors into bank-
ruptcy.12 Congress sought to discourage these scurrilous filings
in several ways. First, Congress tightened the standing require-
ments for petitioning creditors by increasing the threshold ag-
gregate value of petitioning creditors' claims from $500 to
$5,000,127 and by precluding creditors with contingent or validly
disputed claims from joining in an involuntary petition.'2 It also
omitted debts that are either contingent or the subject of a
debtor's bona fide dispute from calculation of the debtor's gen-
eral default.129 Congress also roughly approximated the goal of
collective consensus by continuing the pre-Code requirement
that three petitioners join in an involuntary filing, unless the
v. Nordberg (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 492 U.S. 33 (1989), the constitutionality of
this Congressional limitation upon an involuntary debtor's right to a jury trial on these
issues may be questioned. See, e.g., In re United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, NA.,
901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990).
I" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(f), 507(a)(2). The Commission had recommended that these
"gap" claims be accorded priority. See COMMISsON REPoRT, supra note 4, at 15, 190.
Under the Act, these "gap" creditors were provided only limited protection. See note 57
supra.
.2 COAMISSON RPoRT, supra note 4, at 189-91.
12- 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1), (2).
128 Id.
129 Id. § 303(h)(1).
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debtor has an unusually small number of creditors. 130
Finally, it provided debtors redress for improvidently filed
involuntary petitions. 131 As a preliminary measure to protect in-
voluntary debtors until the hearing on the contested petition,
the court may require the petitioning creditors to file a bond to
indemnify the debtor "for such amounts as the court may later"
award in the event of the dismissal of the petition.13 Moreover,
if the petition ultimately is dismissed for any reason other than
consent of all petitioners and the debtor (and if the debtor does
not waive the right to judgment),1 3 3 the court can award the
debtor costs and attorneys' fees. 134 Unlike section 303(i)(2), sec-
tion 303(i)(1) does not explicitly require a showing of the peti-
tioning creditors' bad faith as a prerequisite to an award of costs
and attorneys' fees. Nonetheless, courts are divided on whether
proof of the petitioners' bad faith should be established before
1-0 Id. § 303(b)(1). See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 769
F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The three creditor requirement is designed to prevent the use
of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings by creditors as a means of harassing an honest
debtor."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986). See also In re Caucus Distrib., Inc., 106
B.R. 890 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (extensive discussion of historical and policy reasons for
three creditor requirement). Although section 303(c) generally permits creditors to join
in an involuntary petition, even where the initial petition does not satisfy section
303(b)'s requirements, courts have dismissed involuntary petitions as filed in bad faith,
and have refused to permit joinder of additional petitioners, when a single creditor filed
the petition despite actual knowledge that the debtor had more than twelve creditors.
See note 150 and accompanying text infra.
131 11 U.S.C. § 303(e), (i). LoPucki argues that the availability of actual and punitive
damages for improvidently filed involuntary petitions largely explains why creditors have
been so reluctant to pursue their bankruptcy collection remedies. LoPucki, supra note
10, at 353.
132 11 U.S.C. § 303(e). Legislative history indicates that the bonding requirement
was intended to "discourage frivolous petitions as well as the more dangerous spiteful
petitions based on a desire to embarrass the debtor ... or to put the debtor out of
business without good cause .... ." H. REP. No. 595, supra note 44, at 323, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6279-80. See also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTrcY, supra note 23, §
303.34, at 303-113.
131 Courts have held that a debtor's voluntary conversion of an involuntary chapter
7 case to a chapter 11 reorganization does not amount to such a waiver. See Paradise
Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1988); Captran Creditors
Trust v. North Am. Title Ins. Agency (In re Captran Creditors Trust), 84 B.R. 812
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
.34 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1). This provision does not mandate that bankruptcy courts
award costs and attorneys' fees, and courts generally have held that "any such award is
solely within the court's discretion." In re Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. 962,
966 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); accord, e.g., Susman v. Schmid (In re Reid), 854 F.2d 156
(7th Cir. 1988); Bankers Trust Co. BT Serv. Co. v. Nordbrock (In re Nordbrock), 772
F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1985).
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allowing such an award.13 5 Alternatively,13 if the petition is dis-
missed against any petitioner found to have filed in bad faith,
the award can include any damages proximately caused by the
filing, 3 7 as well as punitive damages.1 38
11 See, e.g., In re Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. at 967; In re Allen Rog-
ers & Co., 34 B.R. 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also Susman, 854 F.2d at 159-61
(holding that court's discretionary award of attorneys' fees and costs should take into
consideration, not only good or bad faith of petitioners, but also merit of creditors' posi-
tion that petition was properly filed). But see, e.g., In re Leach, 102 B.R. 805 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1989) (debtor entitled to attorneys' fees whether involuntary filing was in bad faith
or not); In re Exchange Network Corp., 85 B.R. 128 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988), aff'd, 92 B.R.
479 (D.C. Colo. 1988) (bankruptcy court awarded debtor costs and attorneys' fees since
clear that filing unjust, but failed to find that petition had been filed in bad faith to
support award of either actual or punitive damages); In re Howard, Neilsen & Rush, Inc.,
2 B.R. 451 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1979) (attorneys' fees and costs awarded, absent finding
of bad faith, because court found that Bankruptcy Rules contemplate routine award of
such amounts following dismissal of involuntary petition).
11" Congress intended the use of the word "or" in section 303(i) to be cumulative. H.
REP. No. 595, supra note 44, at 324 ("[The word or] is not exclusive in this paragraph.
The court may grant any and all of the damages provided for under this provision."); S.
REP. No. 989, supra note 44, at 35 (same). Accord, e.g., In re West Side Community
Hosp., Inc., 112 B.R. 243 (Bankr. N.D. IlL 1990); In re Fox Island Square Partnership,
106 B.R. at 966.
Courts generally agree that the measure of damages provided in section 303(i) are
not the exclusive methods of recovery for an improper involuntary filing, and have per-
mitted recovery under FED. 1. Civ. P. 11, FED. R. APP. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1297, as well
as under state law tort actions for malicious use of civil process. See, e.g., Paradise Hotel
Corp., 842 F.2d at 52; In re American President Lines, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1307, 1310 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); Bankers Trust Co. BT Serv. Co., 772 F.2d at 400-01; In re Omega Trust, 110
B.R. 665 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 120 B.R. 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. at 969-70; Emerald City
Records, Inc. v. First Media Corp. (In re Emerald City Records, Inc.), 9 B.R. 319 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1981). See also Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs. (In re Coboes Indus.
Terminal, Inc.), 931 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing circumstances under which Rule
11 sanctions would be imposed for voluntary petition filed in bad faith, court of appeals
reversed bankruptcy court order imposing sanctions on ground that party who now
sought sanctions had not objected to filing as frivolous during pendency of case). But see
Susman, 854 F.2d at 161-62; Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1987); In re
Ashby Enters., Ltd., 47 B.R. 394 (D.D.C. 1985).
"I See, e.g., In re Tarasi & Tighe, 88 B.R. 706, 712-13 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re
McDonald Trucking Co., Inc., 74 B.R. 474, reconsid. denied, 76 B.R. 513 (Bankr. W.).
Pa. 1987); In re Johnston Hawks Ltd., 72 B.R. 361, 368 (Bankr. D.C. Haw. 1987); In re
Camelot, Inc., 25 B.R. 861, 868 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982), aff'd, 30 B.R. 409 (E.D. Tenn.
1983). But see, e.g., In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1984) (attorneys' fees and costs awarded; actual damages not awarded, despite finding of
bad faith, because proof too speculative).
11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2). See, e.g., In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 72 B.R. at 367 ("The
purpose of punitive damages is to deter similar acts in the future, both by the petitioning
creditors and to serve as an example for others in similar circumstances .... A second
purpose for punitive damages is to punish the petitioning creditors for wrongdoing in
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
There is no single definition of bad faith for purposes of sec-
tion 303(i). Some courts emphasize petitioners' desires to harass,
embarrass or harm the debtor as indicative of bad faith.13"
Others have found bad faith in the petitioning creditors' at-
tempts to use bankruptcy as a substitute for their state collec-
tion remedies.140 Collusive behavior has also often been held to
constitute bad faith."" That one or more creditors solicited
others to join in the involuntary petition is not alone indicative
of collusion or bad faith.1 42 Although one court was persuaded
that a petitioning creditor did not act in bad faith when it relied
on erroneous legal advice,143 several others have found that the
petitioners' reliance on legal advice is not dispositive of their
filing the petition in bad faith.") (citations omitted). For examples of cases in which
punitive damages were thought appropriate, see In re Omega Trust, 110 B.R. 665
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (bankruptcy court awarded punitive damages upon showing that
petitioner filed to embarrass and harass debtor and to gain advantage in pending divorce
action); In re Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. at 968-69 (punitive damages
awarded against petitioning partners in favor of non-petitioning partner when petition-
ing partners were "well aware" that the partnership-debtor disputed their debts); In re
Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 411 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (punitive damages awarded);
In re Laclede Cab Co., 76 B.R. 687 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987) (same); In re McDonald
Trucking Co., Inc., 74 B.R. at 482 (same); Camelot, Inc. v. Hayden (In re Camelot), 30
B.R. at 411 (punitive damages upheld because found appropriate to punish petitioning
creditors for their bad faith filing and necessary to deter similar wrongdoing by others).
But see In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 B.R. 99, 101 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (actual
damages, other than attorneys' fees, not shown; punitive damages not awarded because
filing resulted from poor legal advice). See also Sjostedt v. Salmon (In re Salmon), 128
B.R. 313 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (punitive damages awarded against petitioning creditor
held nondischargeable in subsequent bankruptcy case commenced voluntarily by peti-
tioner/debtor).
"3 See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Corp., 769 F.2d 483,
486-87 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Coppertone Communications, Inc., 96 B.R. 233, 236 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46 B.R. 700, 703-04 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1984); Camelot, Inc. v. Hayden (In re Camelot), 30 B.R. 409 (E.D. Tenn. 1983).
140 See, e.g., In re Tarasi & Tighe, 88 B.R. 706 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re John-
ston Hawkes, Ltd., 72 B.R. 361, 366 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987), aft'd, 885 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.
1989); In re Grecian Heights Owners' Ass'n, 27 B.R. 172, 173 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982). But
see In re Caucus Distribs., Inc., 106 B.R. 890 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
141 See, e.g., In re Winn, 49 B.R. 237 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re Quality Trading
Co., Inc., 36 B.R. 265, 269 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984); In re Eden Assocs., 13 B.R. 578
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 B.R. 549 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
142 See, e.g., In re West Side Community Hosp., Inc., 112 B.R. 243 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1990); In re CLE Corp., 59 B.R. 579, 583-84 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); U.S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986); In re
Manchester Lakes Assocs., 47 B.R. 798, 802 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
13 See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. BT Serv. Co. v. Nordbrock) (In re Nordbrock), 772




Courts also disagree on the nature of the bad faith standard
that should be applied. Some have adopted a purely objective
standard of bad faith.4 5 Others have applied a standard that in-
corporates both objective and subjective elements, inquiring not
only whether a reasonable creditor in the petitioner's position
would have joined in the involuntary petition, but also whether
this creditor's beliefs were honest and purposes permissible.146
Still others have emphasized the creditors' actual knowledge in
finding bad faith, without clarifying whether actual knowledge
must be found.147
Although the Code does not explicitly require that an invol-
untary petition be filed in good faith, it also does not validate
every creditors' motive for coercive collection. In permitting
courts to compensate debtors for some or all of the loss that an
improper involuntary petition can cause, the statute implicitly
recognizes that creditors may be influenced to fie an involuntary
petition for no good reason, for example to secure a negotiating
advantage, or in bad faith, and provides injured debtors with a
remedy. Moreover, despite the lack of express statutory author-
ity, courts have dismissed involuntary petitions found to have
"',See, e.g., In re Turner, 80 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re Godroy
Wholesale Co., Inc., 37 B.R. 496, 500 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). See also Walden v. Bright
Prods., Inc. (In re Walden), 781 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1986).
1I See, e.g., In re Eberhart Moving & Storage, Ltd., 120 B.R. 121 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1990); Jaffe v. Wavelength, Inc. (In re Wavelength, Inc.), 61 B.R. 614 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1986); In re Godroy Wholesale Co., Inc. 37 B.R. at 500; In re Grecian Heights Owners'
Ass'n, 27 B.R. 172, 173 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982); In re Ramsden, 17 B.R. 59, 60 (Bankr. ND.
Ga. 1981); In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 B.R. 99 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
146 See, e.g., In re Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. 962, 967-69 (Bankr. N.D.
IIL 1989); In re Caucus Distribs., Inc., 106 B.R. 890, 923-24 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re
Better Care Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 409-13 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Exchange Network
Corp., 85 B.R. 128, 132 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re Turner, 80 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1987); In re McDonald Trucking Co., Inc., 74 B.R. 474, reconsid. denied, 76 B.R.
513 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Molen Drilling Co., Inc., 68 B.R. 840, 843-45 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1987); In re Elsub Corp., 66 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); U.S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986); In re
Alta Title Co., 55 B.R. 133 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985). Compare FED. R. Cv. P. 11 (combined
objective/subjective standard of good faith as applied to attorney misconduct) with
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (adopting subjective standard for buyer in ordinary course) and id. §
2-103(1)(b) (adopting combined subjective and objective definition of good faith as ap-
plied to merchants).
' See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Corp., 769 F.2d 483,
486-87 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Omega Trust, 110 B.R. 665 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1930); Camelot
Inc. v. Hayden (In re Camelot), 30 B.R. 409, 411 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983).
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been brought in bad faith, just as courts have found the inherent
power to dismiss voluntary petitions filed in bad faith. 148
Courts have not defined "bad faith" in the context of the
dismissal of an involuntary petition in a manner consistent with
the definition applied for purposes of an award of damages
under section 303(i); accordingly, they have dismissed these pe-
titions based on a number of different factual allegations. Most
commonly, involuntary petitions have been dismissed as filed in
bad faith when brought by a single creditor despite knowledge
that more than twelve creditors hold claims against the debtor.
14W Although the Code does not expressly provide for the dismissal of a voluntary
chapter 11 petition filed in bad faith, courts have regularly presumed this inherent
power. Courts of appeal appear to disagree as to the precise definition of bad faith, how-
ever. Some apply a factor approach that seeks to identify sufficient debtor misconduct to
warrant the dismissal of a voluntary case. See, e.g., Phoenix Picadilly v. Life Ins. Co. of
Va. (In re Pheonix Picadilly, Ltd.), 849 F.2d 1393 (11th Cir. 1988) (chapter 11 petition
dismissed as filed in bad faith, notwithstanding potential for successful reorganization,
after consideration of factors that evidenced either intent to abuse judicial process and
purposes of reorganization provisions, or intent to delay or frustrate legitimate efforts to
enforce lien); Heisley v. U.I.P. Engineered Prods. Corp. (In re U.I.P. Engineered Prods.
Corp.), 831 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1987) (same standard; motion to dismiss chapter 11 case as
filed in bad faith denied); Natural Land Corp. v. Baker Farms, Inc., (In re Natural Land
Corp.), 825 F.2d 296 (11th Cir. 1987) (same standard; chapter 11 petition dismissed due
to bad faith filing); In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985) (same).
See also, e.g., Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little
Creek De. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1986) (debtor's bad faith filing would constitute
cause for relief from automatic stay; same standard as above; bad faith not found). See
also In re East-West Assocs., 106 B.R. 767, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (in declining to dismiss
involuntary case as commenced in bad faith, court stated that: "The possibility of an
effective reorganization is not dispositive of the question of good faith . . . however, we
believe that it does reflect favorably on the Petitioning Creditors' efforts and motives.")
(citation omitted).
Other courts have stated that a voluntary chapter 11 petition will not be dismissed
as filed in bad faith unless the movanti also can show that there exists no realistic pros-
pect of an effective reorganization of the debtor. See, e.g., Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886
F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989) (to warrant dismissal of voluntary chapter 11 petition for lack of
good faith filing party in interest must show both objective futility of reorganization ef-
fort and debtor's subjective bad faith in invoking court's jurisdiction); Albany Partners,
Ltd. v. Westbrook (In re Albany Partners, Ltd.), 749 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1984) (chapter
11 petition dismissed for bad faith filing upon showing that there existed no realistic
prospect of effective reorganization for debtor and that debtor sought reorganization re-
lief to delay or frustrate efforts of secured creditors to enforce their rights). See also, e.g.,
First Nat'l Bank of Sioux City v. Kerr (In re Kerr), 908 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1990) (ex-
pressly declining to rule whether proof of debtor's inability to reorganize required dis-
missal for bad faith filing); Fruehauf Corp. v. Jartran, Inc. (In re Jartran, Inc.), 886 F.2d
859 (7th Cir. 1989) (without articulating standard, court declined to dismiss second




Although the Bankruptcy Rules generally permit creditors to
join in an involuntary petition after it has been filed, 14  when a
single creditor files only on the hope that two of the debtor's
other creditors will later join in the petition after the fact, courts
dismiss the petition as having been filed in bad faith. 50 Others
more generally contend that, as courts of equity, they are enti-
tled to inquire into the good faith of petitioning creditors and to
dismiss petitions filed by creditors acting in bad faith.' 5'
Congress also sought to encourage negotiation among a
debtor and its creditors. Section 305 empowers a bankruptcy
court to abstain from a liquidation or reorganization case in "the
interests of creditors and [if] the debtor would be better served
by such dismissal."'52 Legislative history explains that absten-
149 See FED. R. BAN. P. 1003(b).
150 See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 769 F.2d at 486; In
re Caucus Distribs. Inc., 106 B.R. 890 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re Godroy Wholesale
Co., Inc., 37 B.L 496 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). See also In re LaRoche, 131 B.R. 253
(D.RIL 1991) (where involuntary petition initially filed by three creditors in good faith
but one petitioner ruled ineligible due to debtor's successful bona fide dispute of claim,
joinder of additional petitioning creditor was permitted); In re Centennial Ins. Assocs.,
Inc., 119 B.R. 543 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) (where involuntary petition initially filed in
bad faith by three creditors, one of which was later held to hold debt subject to debtor's
bona fide dispute, joinder of additional petitioning creditor was denied); In re Molen
Drilling Co., Inc., 68 B.R. 840 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (debtor's motion to dismiss invol-
untary petition filed by single creditor dismissed, among other reasons, because peti-
tioner in good faith relied on public filings which indicated that debtor had fewer than
twelve creditors). This case law derives froni Act § 59b (codified at 11 US.C. § 95(b)
(repealed 1978)), and former Bankruptcy Rule 104(e). See also In re Crown Sportswear,
Inc., 575 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1978) (Act); Speed Equip. Worlds of Am., Inc. v. Hunt (In re
Hunt), 496 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
"I See, e.g., In re Wedgewood Golf Assocs., Ltd., 88 B.R. 711 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1988) (involuntary chapter 11 petition filed by fewer than all general partners of partner-
ship dismissed when deadlock among partners would have precluded confirmation of
plan of reorganization); In re Vincent J. Fasano, Inc., 55 B.R. 409 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1985) (lead petitioning creditor misrepresented facts to obtain joinder of others in invol-
untary petition; petition dismissed as filed in bad faith); In re Quality Trading Co., Inc.,
36 B.R. 265 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984) (petitioner's collusive attempt to create claim against
debtor sufficient cause for dismissal of involuntary petition); In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6
B.R. 549 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (collusion between unsecured creditors and debtor
cause for dismissal of involuntary petition when petition was filed on eve of foreclosure
sale of debtor's primary asset, and debtor had changed from nominee trust to business
trust just prior to fling in order to become eligible for bankruptcy relief). See also, e.g.,
In re Trina Assocs., 128 B.R. 858 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (in dicta referring to inherent
power to dismiss involuntary petition filed in bad faith; bad faith not found); Carteret
Say. Bank, F.A. v. Natasi-White, Inc. (In re East-West Assocs.), 106 B.R. 767 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (same).
12 11 U.S.C. § 305.
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tion would be appropriate under this section,
for example, if an arrangement is being worked out by creditors and
the debtor out of court, there is no prejudice to the results of creditors
in that arrangement, and an involuntary case has been commenced by
a few recalcitrant creditors to provide a basis for future threats to
extract full payment. The less expensive out-of-court work-out may
better serve the interests in the case.18
Thus, although the Code permits as few as three (and sometimes
only one) petitioning creditors to file an involuntary petition, a
bankruptcy court can abstain from an involuntary case if it de-
termines that the bulk of the debtor's creditors prefer their
nonbankruptcy collection remedies and pursuit of these collec-
tion methods is not prejudicial to the creditors as a whole.
Courts have dismissed involuntary cases under section 305
where pending negotiations or state court remedies promoted
more economic and efficient means of distributinj the debtor's
estate.154 The mere fact that negotiations or state court proceed-
ings are currently pending is not dispositive of a motion under
section 305, however.155
"'3 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 44, at 325; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 44, at 36.
154 See, e.g., In re Trina Assocs., 128 B.R. 858 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (bankruptcy
court abstained from involuntary case to serve best interests of debtor partnerships and
their secured creditors where settlement agreement had been reached in context of state
foreclosure action); In re Williamsburg Suites, Ltd., 117 B.R. 216 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990)
(bankruptcy court abstained from involuntary case where state partnership law better
able to resolve termination of partnership); In re Kass, 114 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1990) (court abstained from involuntary petition where adequate state law remedies ex-
isted in that disputes all involved pending divorce proceeding); In re Fales, 73 B.R. 44
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (bankruptcy court granted motion to abstain from case where
state court fraudulent transfer action would serve creditors' interests less expensively
than pending involuntary bankruptcy case); In re Deacon Plastics Mach., Inc., 49 B.R.
982 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (involuntary case dismissed where involuntary debtor had
transferred all its assets to secured creditor during gap period in satisfaction of lien;
since transfer was proper, and there was nothing left to distribute to creditors, court held
abstention was warranted); In re Michael S. Starbuck, Inc., 14 B.R. 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981) (involuntary case dismissed when pending SEC equity receivership was providing
means for efficient and equitable distributions to creditors); In re Evans, 8 B.R. 568
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (involuntary case dismissed since the action was nothing more
than bitter rehash of contested divorce proceeding); In re Luftek, 6 B.R. 539 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1980) (involuntary case dismissed when petition filed by few recalcitrant credi-
tors and majority of debtor's creditors more likely to be repaid outside of bankruptcy
due to pending loan commitment); In re Sun World Broadcasters, Inc., 5 B.R. 719
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) (involuntary case dismissed in favor of state court receivership
that had been pending for four years before bankruptcy case commenced).
'55 See, e.g., In re Barth, 109 B.R. 570 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (involuntary case not
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II. CREDITORS' DISINCENTIVES TO COMMENCE AN INVOLUNTARY
BANKRUPTCY CASE
When Congress abolished "acts of bankruptcy" as the stan-
dard for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case, it
did so for two different but related reasons. First, it recognized
that petitioning creditors had difficulty establishing their
debtor's insolvency, which often was an element under the "acts
of bankruptcy." 156 More than just to simplify proof of the stan-
dard for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case,
however, Congress also recognized that "a major factor explain-
ing the smallness of distributions in business bankruptcies is the
delay in the institution of proceedings for liquidation until as-
sets are largely depleted. '157 Hence by abolishing the acts of
bankruptcy, Congress also intended "to encourage and facilitate
earlier resort to [bankruptcy] relief" and, as a result, to increase
dividends to creditors."' More than just reform the standard for
commencement of an involuntary case, with its enactment of the
present Code Congress also made alterations to other aspects of
the statutes governing involuntary filings.'59 With these other re-
forms, Congress intended to temper the negotiating leverage
dismissed where trustee in bankruptcy and single creditor opposed debtor's motion and
debtor had failed to provide trustee with list of creditors); In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc.,
108 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (court declined to abstain from involuntary bank-
ruptcy case, despite creditor's state foreclosure action, when dismissal would permit fore-
closing creditor to gain possession of debtor's sole asset worth $8 million in satisfaction
of $5 million debt thus depriving debtor's other creditors of $3 million equity); In re
Monterrey Equities-Hillside, 73 B.R. 749 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (involuntary case not
dismissed, despite pending foreclosure action); In re Ross, 63 B.R. 951 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986) (involuntary case retained despite debtor's offer of security to petitioning creditors
in settlement of their claims); In re Paolino, 49 B.R. 834 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (despite
pendency of state court receivership, motion to dismiss involuntary case denied due to
lack of proof of duplication of effort); In re Zoomaire, Inc., 47 B.R. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985) (motion to abstain from involuntary case denied, despite pendency of state disso-
lution action and despite jurisdictional problems trustee in bankruptcy likely to face in
pursuing debtor's indemnitor); In re Midwest Processing Co., 41 B.R. 90 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1984) (motion to dismiss involuntary case dismissed on grounds that success of debtor's
out-of-court workout was speculative); In re Kenval Mktg. Corp., 40 B.R. 445 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1984) (court denied motion of assignee for benefit of creditors to abstain, after
comparing powers of assignee and trustee in bankruptcy to avoid allegedly preferential
transfers).
"' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 14, 188.
... Id. at 14.
See id. at 14-15, 188-91, 192-93.
,' See text accompanying notes 124-38 supra.
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that the liberalized standard might have otherwise created, by
discouraging bad faith filings and encouraging creditors to pur-
sue less expensive and more expeditious nonbankruptcy solu-
tions to a debtor's financial crisis.
There is no empirical evidence to show that this statutory
reform has had any impact on distributions to creditors.16 Nor
are there statistics to determine whether creditors now file invol-
untary petitions at an earlier stage in their debtor's financial
troubles than they did under the former Act. Statistics do show,
however, that the number of involuntary petitions has increased
very little, if at all, since enactment of the "general failure to
pay" standard.161 Whether the consistently small numbers of in-
voluntary filings mean that Congress's reform of the standard
for commencement of an involuntary case was unsuccessful de-
pends upon which of Congress's purposes is considered.
When its goal of easing creditors' difficulties in proving the
standard for commencement of an involuntary case is consid-
ered, clearly Congress did not succeed. Creditors continue to
have difficulties obtaining access to the information necessary to
commence a bankruptcy case against a debtor's will. But this
failure is fairly easily remedied by further reform to the stan-
dard.162 When its intent to increase dividends to creditors, by
inviting earlier or more frequent involuntary petitions, is consid-
ered, Congress's failure is less easily remedied but perhaps less
troublesome. It is harder to get creditors to file sooner or more
often, not because the standard requires tinkering, but because
creditors prefer nonjudicial resolution of payment disputes for
many reasons, including creditors' and debtors' interests in pre-
serving their viable long-standing relationships. Congress's invi-
tation to creditors' petitions was inconsistent, not merely com-
petitive, with its intent to encourage creditors to pursue these
nonbankruptcy solutions to debtor/creditor problems. Thus
Congress succeeded in its goal to encourage creditors to pursue
nonbankruptcy options for resolution of a debtor's difficulties,
although this success is moderated by Congress's failure to get
26o The Administrative Office has not published statistics on distributions to credi-
tors from bankruptcy estates since enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978.
Compare BANKRUPTCY STATISTICAL TABLES (1976-77) supra note 6 (Tables FS-F11) with
id. (1979-89).
See note 6 supra.
202 See text accompanying notes 230-70 infra.
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creditors to file petitions earlier and more often.
A. Informational Disadvantages
The "general failure to pay" standard is not an easy one for
creditors to satisfy. To commence an involuntary case, petition-
ing creditors must be able to show that the debtor generally is
not paying its debts as they come due, without regard to those
debts as to which the debtor can raise a bona fide dispute.1 e3
Proof of this requires not only general information about the
debtor's cash disbursements, but also about the due dates of its
obligations, whether the debtor's nonpayment of a past due obli-
gation is the result of an inability or an unwillingness to pay,
and, if the latter, whether the debtor's dispute involves a sub-
stantial issue of fact or law. 64 While a debtor's general default
may be easier to prove than its insolvency, clearly the public na-
ture of this event has been overstated. 165 Creditors often do not
have ready access to information 16 1 from which to determine
whether the debtor is generally unable to pay its debts as they
come due. 67
",3 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1).
I" Debtors, of course, are in the best position to determine their own general de-
fault, but not even a debtor can be assured whether it can satisfy the "general failure to
pay" standard when it disputes a significant portion of its obligations, because the deter-
mination as to whether a debtor's disputes are bona fide is governed by an objective
standard and not by what the debtor represents to be its state of mind.
'"' See, e.g., B.D. Int'l Discount Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA (In re B.D.
Int'l Discount Corp.), 701 F.2d 1071, 1075 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that Congress had failed
in its effort to streamline proof of standard for commencement of involuntary case by
enacting a standard "woefully lacking in clarity").
"' For a general discussion of the relationship between information, communication
and collection remedies, see Arthur A. Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite - The Dynam-
ics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 26-46 (1970); William C. Whitford, A Critique
of the Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979 Wis. L. Ray. 1047, 1106-07.
1"I Creditors do not face a similar disadvantage when they seek to coerce repayment
through their individual collection remedies. All that a creditor must plead and prove in
order to obtain a judgment is that the debtor owes a certain amount on a claim, that the
amount is due, and that the debtor has refused to pay its obligation-information easily
available to a creditor. A creditor may also want information about whether the debtor
has non-exempt assets subject to execution, but a creditor generally can compel a debtor
to provide it with access to this sort of information under state law. CAL. CIV. Porc. CODE:
§ 704.720-.850 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. Cirv. Pa~c. L. & R. 5206 (McKinney 1978
& Supp. 1991). Whitford argues that these post-judgment discovery measures are largely
ineffective and involve "purposeless technicalities" because they generally require proof




Until the news spreads by word of mouth, 68 a creditor may
be unaware of a debtor's general default,6 " unless the debtor in-
forms the public of the occurrence of this event either because it
is a public company'7 0 and is obligated to file quarterly financial
268 With some debtors, word of mouth can be extremely effective. With public
figures, like Donald Trump, word of financial difficulty is front page news. See, e.g., Judi
Bevan, Depression, Divorce and 'The Donald', DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 23, 1990, at 24;
Richard D. Hylton, $1.1 Million Loan Payment Missed by Trump on Shuttle, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at D1; James Kim, Trump's Luck Runs Bad, USA Today, Sept.
21, 1990, at 1B (Money); James Kim, Trump Loan for Shuttle in Default, USA TODAY,
Sept. 20, 1990, at 1B (Money); Allan Sloan, Trump's Bankers Hold All the Cards in the
Fate of the Taj Mahal Casino, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1990, at F3. Most debtors aren't as
renowned as Donald Trump however, with their general default newsworthy only to the
few creditors stung by the nonpayment.
160 Cf. LoPucki, supra note 10, at 329:
The determination of viability is costly and at best highly subjective. In at-
tempting to compare going-concern value with liquidation value, the creditor
will have difficulty with both sides of the equation. The creditor must guess at
the value of assets he has no right to inspect, sold under procedures not
designed to obtain the best price. Predictions as to the future earning capacity
of the business, uncertain in any circumstances, are particularly uncertain
here. Usually little information is available to work from other than the
debtor's chaotic accounting and his unwaveringly rosy future outlook.
170 Moreover, finance theorists have developed models to predict the likelihood of
bankruptcy, but these models apply only to public companies. See, e.g., Edward I. Alt-
man, Why Businesses Fail, 3 J. Bus. STRATEGY 15 (1983); Edward I. Altman et. al., Zeta
Analysis: A New Model to Identify Bankruptcy Risk of Corporations, 1 J. BANKING &
FIN. 29 (1977); Edward I. Altman, Predicting Railroad Bankruptcies in America, 4 BELL
J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 184 (1973); Edward I. Altman, Financial Ratios, Discriminant
Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN., Sept. 1968, at 589;
Beaver, Alternative Accounting Measures As Predictors of Failure, Acc. REv. 113
(1968); Beaver, Financial Ratios as Predictive of Failure, in EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN Ac-
COUNTING: SELECTED STUDIES, 4 J. AcCT. RES. 71 (Supp. 1966); Blum, Failing Company
Discriminant Analysis, J. AcCT. RES., Spring 1974, at 1; Deakin, A Discriminant Analy-
sis of Predictors of Business Failure, J. Acar. RES., Spring 1972, at 167; Edminster, An
Empirical Test of Financial Ratio Analysis for Small Business Failure Prediction, J.
FIN. & QUANT. ANAL., Mar. 1972, at 1477; Michael J. Gombola et. al., Cash Flow in Bank-
ruptcy Prediction, FIN. MGMT, Winter 1987, at 55; James A. Largay & Clyde P. Stickney,
Cash Flows, Ratio Analysis and the W.T. Grant-Company Bankruptcy, 36 FIN. ANALY-
SiS J., July/Aug. 1980, at 51; Paul A. Meyer & Howard W. Pifer, Prediction of Bank
Failures, 25 J. FIN., Sept. 1970, at 853; Curtis L. Norton & Ralph E. Smith, A Compari-
son of General Price Level and Historical Cost Financial Statements in the Prediction
of Bankruptcy, 54 Accr. REV., Jan. 1979, at 72; Ohlson, Financial Ratios and the Proba-
bilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy, J. AccT. RES., Spring 1980, at 109; Gerald V. Post &
Soo-Young Modn, A Pooled Cross-Section Time-Series Approach to Business Failures
in 18 U.S. Cities, 40 J. ECON. & Bus. 45 (1988); Rose et. al., Predicting Business Failure:
A Macroeconomic Perspective, 6 J. Accr. AUDITING & FIN. 20 (1982); Subhash Sharma &
Vijay Mahajan, Early Warning Indicators of Business Failure, 44 J. MKTG 80 (1980);
Joseph F. Sinkey, Jr., A Multivariate Statistical Analysis of the Characteristics of Prob-
lem Banks, 30 J. FIN., Mar. 1975, at 21; Christine V. Zavgren & George E. Friedman, Are
[Vol. 57: 803
INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS
reports under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934' or for
some other reason.172 Credit reporting agencies may provide, for
a fee, historical and anecdotal information about a debtor's de-
faults,173 but knowing that the debtor has defaulted on occasion
in the past is not proof that the debtor is generally not paying
its debts as they come due.174 In addition, creditors will have a
difficult time assessing which of the debtor's unpaid debts are
disputed and whether a dispute is bona fide. If litigation is in-
volved, there may exist a public record of the dispute. But a dis-
pute need not involve pending litigation to qualify as bona fide.
Nor is the mere pendency of a lawsuit decisive of the bona fides
of the debtor's dispute. Moreover, creditors cannot be confident
of their ability to establish the illegitimacy of the debtor's dis-
putes because the determination of whether the debtor's dis-
putes are bona fide is a legal one for the bankruptcy court to
resolve.
Even if creditors theoretically have access to information
about the occurrence, regularity and nature of a debtor's de-
Bankruptcy Prediction Models Worthwhile? An Application in Securities Analysis, 28
Mo r. INT'L REV. 34 (1988). For a general survey of this literature, see Christine V. Zav-
gren, The Prediction of Corporate Failure: The State of the Art, J. Accr. LiT., Spring
1983, at 1.
17' Section 13(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)
(1988). At the risk of oversimplifying a rich and complex area of the law, there would
appear to be no duty for a public company to inform the public of changes in its finan-
cial condition more frequently than on a quarterly basis (except in the narrow case of
material changes to the financial condition of an issuer under a shelf registration).
172 If the debtor seeks to resolve its financial troubles through an exchange offer of
its public debt for newly issued securities, the Trust Indenture Act requires that the
debtor issuer publicly file a report which discloses material information concerning the
securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77eee, 77j and Securities and Exchange Commission regula-
tions promulgated thereunder. In these public filings, debtors often inform their public
debt holders that the exchange offer is necessary due to the debtor's financial difficulties
and that a failure of debt holders in the requisite percentage to accept the offer may
require the debtor to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition to accomplish a coerced re-
structuring of its public and other debL
173 For example, Dun & Bradstreet Credit Services provides what it refers to as
"Payment Analysis Services" to its subscribers. These Payment Analysis Reports com-
pare a debtor's payment performance in relation to similar-size companies in the same
indutry.
1'4 Certainly stories about the debtor's prior defaults are informative to creditors in
making decisions about whether to extend, or continue to extend, credit to the debtor,
and may even be predictive of the debtor's financial or business failure. But their value




faults and disputes, the cost of acquiring this information may
be so great as to deter creditors from making the effort. Because
access to information may be costly, creditors with small
claims-especially small claims that arise out of a single, dis-
crete transaction-will have little incentive to acquire informa-
tion about the debtor's financial condition. 175 They may choose
to rely on other creditors or the debtor to commence a bank-
ruptcy case, even though the benefits of a collective proceeding
may outweigh the costs associated with making an informed de-
cision about the need for bankruptcy.1
7 6
That creditors are disadvantaged in their access to the
debtor's financial information need not necessarily discourage
them from initiating an involuntary case. Plaintiffs often act on
a hunch in bringing a suit, hoping to build a case after the com-
plaint is filed and discovery is available. Within bounds,1 " that
sort of behavior is not only tolerated by the law, but encouraged.
Moreover, once the debtor is subject to the jurisdiction of the
175 See David G. Carlson, Bankruptcy Philosophy, 85 MicH. L. REV. 1341, 1356 n.43
(1987) ("The race of diligent creditors promotes the interest of those vested with power
over and information in the debtor, because knowledgeable or influential creditors are
more likely to win the race."); LoPucki, supra note 10, at 329-330 ("Where the debt is
relatively small it is impractical for a single creditor to attempt to make the determina-
tion [as to the debtor's viability]."); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 Cmii. L.
REv. 775, 794 (1987) ("Creditors with small claims may reasonably conclude that the
costs of an involuntary filing are too great to make bankruptcy an attractive alterna-
tive."). The notion that creditors with small claims have little financial incentive to par-
ticipate actively in a bankruptcy case justifies the creation of an official committee to
represent the interests of all of a debtor's general creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 705, 1102-1103.
Similarly, courts of appeal have permitted the filing of class proofs of claim in bank-
ruptcy cases, despite ambiguity in the Code and Bankruptcy Rules, among other reasons,
because they provide a cost-effective means for numerous small claims to be asserted
against a debtor. See The Certified Class in the Charter Sec. Litig. v. The Charter Co.,
(In re The Charter Co.), 876 F.2d 866 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 3232
(1990); In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1988).
176 See Warren, supra note 175, at 794:
In effect, these creditors often depend either on the debtor or on creditors with
larger claims to make the filing decision-even when the small-claim creditors
would gain from a bankruptcy resolution. Some other creditors may have
enough at stake to make it worthwhile for them to institute an involuntary
filing, but they will not file if they lack the information to make a rational
decision. They too may rely on the filing either of the debtor or of other credi-
tors with superior information. The rub, of course, is that small or uninformed
creditors must rely on parties who may be able to profit more (legally or other-
wise) outside bankruptcy and who are disinclined to lead the debtor into
bankruptcy.
I' See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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bankruptcy court,1 78 creditors will have access to virtually all in-
formation about the debtor's financial affairs, both through the
examination process 79 and through the trustee in bankruptcy
who is appointed in all liquidation cases 80 (and who, for cause,
may be appointed in a reorganization case)"8' in order, among
other things, to investigate the debtor's financial affairs. 182
But the informational disadvantages that creditors face
before a bankruptcy case has been commenced clearly outweigh
the advantages they enjoy after the case is brought.8 3 Congress
sought to encourage creditors to bring involuntary cases, but it
also feared the unwarranted filing of involuntary petitions. To
prevent the filing of an involuntary petition against financially
sound debtors, the Bankruptcy Code permits courts to require
creditors to compensate debtors for all out-of-pocket expenses
incurred in successfully defending an involuntary petition, as
well as additional damages if they can show that the petitioning
creditors acted in bad faith..8 ' The threat of a sanction that
creditors are certain to face if an involuntary petition is dis-
missed for any reason, and the possibility of actual and punitive
,78 Even before an order for relief is entered, petitioning creditors have access to
information about an involuntary debtor's financial affairs. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1003 re-
quires a debtor who contests an involuntary petition on the grounds that too few credi-
tors have joined in the petition because it owes twelve or more creditors to "file with the
answer a list of all creditors with their addresses, a brief statement of the nature of their
claims, and the amounts thereof." Moreover, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1018 generally applies
the federal rules of discovery to proceedings related to a contested involuntary petition.
See Rubin v. Belo Broadcasting Corp., (In re Rubin), 769 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1985) (due
to lower court's failure to use less drastic measures, court of appeals reversed bankruptcy
court's entry of order for relief as sanction for involuntary debtor's failure to cooperate
with petitioning creditors' discovery requests, but generally upheld bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction to impose discovery sanctions against involuntary debtor during gap period
between filing of petition and entry of order of relief). Until the Bankruptcy Rules were
amended in 1983, the applicability of normal pretrial discovery to contested involuntary
petitions was unclear. See 1 HARvEY R. MILLER & 1iCHAEL, L Coos. A PRAcric L GUIDE
TO THE BANKRUPTCY RFeoRhi AcT 81-82 (1984 Supp.).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 341; FED. R. BANK&. P. 2004.
Is- 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702.
181 Id. § 1104.
181 Id. §§ 704, 1106.
' See, e.g., 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, supra note 23, 303.30 ("Discovery may be
conducted before trial of the involuntary case by any of the parties in the case ....
Nevertheless, considering that petitioning creditors risk a damage claim by the debtor
pursuant to section 303(i), creditors will generally avoid filing involuntary cases without
having sufficient information to state a cause of action in the petition.").
18, 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). See text accompanying notes 131-38 supra.
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damages should the court question their motives in filing, un-
doubtedly chills creditors from filing involuntary petitions based
upon even well-founded suspicion.'85
By contrast, creditors are able to establish the second stan-
dard for commencement of an involuntary case-the appoint-
ment of a custodian or the custodian's possession of the debtor's
property-by referring to publicly available information, since
the appointment of an assignee for the benefit of creditors or an
equitable receiver generally is a matter of public record. More-
over, the appointment is good circumstantial evidence that the
debtor is unable to pay its debts as they come due. By virtue of
the applicable standards, commencement of an assignment for
the benefit of creditorse' or receivership,"'7 often is indicative of
the debtor's inability to pay debts as they come due. Moreover,
in either event, the custodian is likely to freeze payments to
creditors pending resolution of the equitable basis for the ap-
pointment, and may have been appointed to supervise the liqui-
dation of all or some of the debtor's assets. Indeed, Congress im-
plicitly recognized this justification when it explained, in
legislative history, that creditors who wait more than 120 days
past such an appointment should have little difficulty in estab-
lishing a debtor's general default from proof that a custodian
has been in possession for more than 120 days. 88
185 See e.g., MILLER & COOK, supra note 178, at 83 (advising counsel for petitioning
creditors to "insist upon reliable factual information before filing petition"); LoPucki,
supra note 10, at 353 (same); Warren, supra note 175, at 795 ("But the Code also exacer-
bates the inaccessibility of bankruptcy by imposing stiff penalties for wrongful involun-
tary filings, thus discouraging creditors from filing unless they are very certain that their
choice to file will be upheld in court.").
16 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1031 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 727.104
(West 1990). But see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-117-401 to -407 (Michie 1987) (no
mention of requirement of allegation of balance sheet or equitable insolvency as prereq.
uisite to assignment for benefit of creditors); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 493-010 (West 1979
& Supp. 1991) (same); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2101 (1991) (same); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 28-301
to -320 (Harrison 1980 & Supp. 1988) (same); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 426.010 to .410 (Vernon
1952 & Supp. 1991) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 19-1 to -50 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991)
(same).
187 See MacLachlan, Aspects of the Chandler Bill, supra note 58, at 367 nn.82-83:
A creditor praying for a receivership must show that he will probably suffer
irreparable injury if the relief is not granted .... Insolvency is neither per so
ground for receivership nor is it an indispensable circumstance .... But where
a debtor is unable to pay his debts as they mature, a court of equity will in a
proper case assume control of his property.
188 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 44, at 324; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 44, at 34.
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A peculiar thing about this second ground is that Congress
did not include other types of external evidence of a debtor's
financial difficulties as alternate grounds for the commencement
of an involuntary case. Why shouldn't creditors be able to assert
a corporate or partnership debtor's commencement of dissolu-
tion proceedings, or a business debtor's cessation of operations
with debts unpaid,189 or an individual debtor's unexplained dis-
appearance,' e" as grounds for commencement of an involuntary
bankruptcy case? Why shouldn't creditors be able to force a
debtor into bankruptcy if the debtor has admitted its inability
to pay debts as they come due?191
The standard is also strangely limited to the 120 days after
appointment of a custodian. Why shouldn't creditors be able to
assert the appointment of an equitable receivership as the basis
for an involuntary bankruptcy case, even if the appointment oc-
curred 121, rather than 120, days before the filing of the peti-
tion? 92 Congress's remark in legislative history that creditors
should easily be able to prove a debtor's general failure to pay
debts as they come due1 93 is unpersuasive, since the burden of
proving a debtor's general default is much greater than proving
the appointment of a custodian. By setting this arbitrary dead-
line, Congress may have presumed that appointments which per-
sist in excess of 120 days are in the best interests of the debtor
See note 123 supra.
11" MacLachlan referred to this as "stoppage of payments" and recommended that a
"stoppage of payments" constitute a rebuttable presumption of a debtor's inability to
pay debts as they accrue. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, § 68, at 59-60.
1"0 MacLachlan described a debtor's "unexplained disappearance" as "absconding"
and recommended that absconding constitute a rebuttable presumption of the debtor's
inability to pay debts as they come due. Id.
'"" Under the former Bankruptcy Act, the debtor's admission in writing of its inabil-
ity to pay debts as they came due and its willingness to be adjudicated a bankrupt con-
stituted an act of bankruptcy. See text accompanying note 42 supra. MacLachlan recom-
mended the retention of this act of bankruptcy, although he generally disfavored the acts
of bankruptcy as the standard for bringing an involuntary case. See MAcLAcHLAN, supra
note 24, § 67, at 58-59.
192 Some have argued that the 120 day limitation reflects a federal deference, on
comity grounds, to the state law remedies of equitable receivership and assignment for
the benefit of creditors. See, e.g., BAID & JAcKSON, supra note 40, at 1298-1301. But the
Act had provided that the appointment of an equitable receiver or an assignee for the
benefit of creditors constituted an act of bankruptcy, without reference to the time be-
tween the appointment and the filing of the involuntary petition. See text accompanying
notes 40-41 supra.
192 See note 188 and accompanying text supra.
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and its creditors, and that the debtor should accordingly be in-
sulated from an involuntary petition. This blanket presumption
seems an unwarranted shifting of the burden of proof, however,
since a party requesting abstention from an involuntary case
under section 305 otherwise would bear the burden of proving
that the case contradicts the group's best interests.194
B. Preferences for Non-Judicial Resolutions
Creditors may decide not to force their debtor into bank-
ruptcy for reasons other than that they are unable to gain access
to the information necessary to establish that their debtor "gen-
erally is not paying [its] debts as [they] come due."19 5 Creditors
may decide not to file an involuntary petition because, for one
reason or another, they prefer not to seek the aid of the courts
in collecting the debtor's unpaid debt. General creditors need
not, and often do not, seek the aid of the courts and their of-
ficers to coerce repayment of delinquent debts. Debtors may be
persuaded to pay simply by force of moral suasion or use of the
forceful negotiating leverage creditors can marshall.
Creditors may prefer not to pursue their coercive collection
remedies because they stand to gain little from litigation with
the debtor. Because all coercive remedies involve repayment
from the proceeds of the forced sale of unencumbered, nonex-
empt property, creditors may determine that coercion would be
fruitless because their debtor's assets are mostly exempt or sub-
ject to liens,196
Even when creditors are able to identify nonexempt, unen-
cumbered assets, they may be reluctant to rely on repayment
from the receipts of a forced sale of these assets. Repayment
from the proceeds of a forced sale will be a less efficient and
effective collection device than a method that relies on repay-
ment out of liquid funds, because forced sales of assets generally
result in a loss of value. 197 There generally is no ready market
'" 11 U.S.C. § 305. See text accompanying notes 152-55 supra.
11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1).
We While only individual debtors enjoy the benefit of state and federal exemption
laws, Id. § 522(b)(2)(A), even a nonindividual debtor may grant a blanket lien against
the bulk of its assets. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-110, -111, -203.
'1" Whitford, supra note 166, at 1060, 1097.
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for used goods, especially consumer goods.9 8 Even if a market
were to exist, debtors lose value in a forced sale of their assets
since it often is more expensive for a debtor to replace used
goods than to continue to use them. e9 And forced sales never
compensate an individual debtor for lost sentimental value, or a
business debtor for lost idiosyncratic value, that may be associ-
ated with an asset. 00 In addition, forced sales generally bring
lower prices than voluntary sales.2 01 Because the debtor has no
choice but to sell, bidders can make lowball offers knowing that
the debtor cannot take the goods out of the market and wait for
a higher bid. Nor can the debtor counteract this effect by ensur-
ing that there exists competition among the bidders since a
debtor generally has no control over the terms or conditions of
the execution sale. Indeed, execution sales nearly always cause a
loss of the going concern value of a debtor's assets202 because
levying sheriffs generally are required either to take physical
possession of the debtor's property, or to render it unusable,
thus ensuring the cessation of a debtor's business. 03 All of these
factors mean that creditors generally should prefer voluntary re-
payment to a coerced collection action unless the coercive rem-
edy is against liquid assets, such as often is the case in the state
198 Id. at 1060.
199 Leff, supra note 166, at 12-14; Whitford, supra note 166, at 1060, 1097.
200 Leff, supra note 166, at 12-14; Whitford, supra note 166, at 1060, 1097.
201 Whitford, supra note 166, at 1060, 1097.
202 Going concern value is simply the value that a collection of assets would have if
sold together as a group, rather than one at a time. A collection of assets often is more
valuable if sold together than if sold piecemeal. Of course, the existence of going concern
value isn't limited to business debtors. An individual debtor's assets may be more valua-
ble if sold together than one at a time if the debtor is a collector, for example. Moreover,
not all business debtors have going concern value to preserve. For example, a business
debtor's assets may be more valuable if sold one at a time, rather than as a whole, if
there is little or no goodwill value to be added to the aggregate of the assets.
20I See, e.g., CA. CIv. PROC. CODE § 700.030 (West 1987) ("[To levy upon tangible
personal property in the possession or under the control of the judgment debtor, the
levying officer shall take the property into custody."); N.J. STAT. AN, § 2A:26-12 (West
1987) ("Personal property of a defendant attached as provided by this chapter shall re-
main in the safekeeping of the attaching officer to answer and abide the judgment of the
court."); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5232(b) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1991) ("The sheriff
shall levy upon any interest of the judgment debtor in personal property capable of de-
livery by taking the property into his custody .... "). See also Knapp v. McFarland, 462
F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating generally that, when judgment debtor's property is capa-
ble of delivery, sheriff ordinarily is obligated to levy by taking property into custody).
See generally LoPucki, supra note 10, at 317.
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
collection remedy of garnishment.204
Moreover, creditors of an individual debtor rarely have any-
thing to gain from the commencement of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy case because the filing of a petition is a particularly inef-
fective means of coercing repayment of an individual debtor's
obligations. 05 As under state law, only the proceeds from the
forced sale of unencumbered, nonexempt assets are available for
distribution from a bankruptcy estate. 06 Because most individu-
als own few nonexempt assets, creditors are most likely to be
repaid from an individual debtor's wages. But the filing of an
involuntary petition forecloses repayment from an individual
debtor's earnings, since an individual debtor's post-petition
wages are not included among the "property of the estate" dis-
tributed to general creditors.01 In addition, most individuals re-
ceive a discharge from any indebtedness that remains unpaid af-
ter the close of the bankruptcy case.20 The discharge acts as a
204 See Leff, supra note 166, at 14; Whitford, supra note 166, at 1054.
205 See Leff, supra note 166, at 5-18; Whitford, supra note 166; at 1049-71, 1100-05.
Nonetheless, creditors might determine to file an involuntary petition against an individ-
ual debtor whom they suspected of engaging in fraudulent activities or other misconduct.
A trustee is automatically appointed upon the commencement of a liquidation case, and
trustees in bankruptcy are well-equipped to investigate and remedy a debtor's fraudu-
lent conduct. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 704. Moreover, creditors may succeed in objecting to the
debtor's discharge, or excepting their debts from the debtor's general discharge. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 523, 727.
200 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 726.
207 Id. § 541(a)(6).
200 Id. § 524. But see id. §§ 523, 727. Although only individual debtors receive a
discharge in a chapter 7 liquidation case, id. § 727(a)(1), even corporate and partnership
debtors-in- possession receive a discharge upon confirmation of most sorts of chapter 11
reorganization plans. Compare id. § 727(a)(1) with id. § 1141(d). Only when a chapter 11
debtor-in-possession (i) liquidates all or substantially all of its property pursuant to a
plan of reorganization, (ii) does not engage in business after consummation of the plan,
and (iii) would be denied a discharge in a chapter 7 liquidation case (which would be
true in the case of every debtor that is not an individual) will confirmation of a chapter
11 plan not result in discharge. Id. § 1141(d)(3). Moreover, although a discharge gener-
ally only applies to debts owed by the debtor, id. § 524(e), the principals of a business
debtor may be able to structure the plan of reorganization so that they will be discharged
from their secondary liability on the company's liability. Compare, e.g., Republic Supply
Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1987) with, e.g., Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426
(9th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds by, 58 U.S.L.W. 4210 (1991); Union Carbide v.
Newboles, 686 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1982). In other proper circumstances, the bankruptcy
court may enjoin creditors from proceeding against certain nondebtor entities. See, e.g.,
American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp., (In re American Hardwoods, Inc.),
885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins, Inc.), 880
F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 376 (1989); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville
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further injunction against collection on pre-petition claims.20 9
Creditors' preference for extralegal solutions to the debtor's
nonpayment also follows from the simple fact that there often is
little to lose from pursuit of nonjudicial collection efforts. It is
cheaper and easier to collect a debt by dunning the debtor with
telephone calls and letters than to sue the debtor in court. 10
And, in some cases, creditors may write off the bad debt as a
loss and take the tax deduction rather than litigate the claim in
the hope of collecting a small portion of its entirety.211
Moreover, the threat of coercive collection remedies can be
far more effective than implementation of the remedies them-
selves. All litigation involves the risk that the defendant will be
successful in defending the suit.21 2 Litigation against a debtor
with financial difficulties is almost certain to net less-than-full
recovery. This uncertainty provides creditors with a forceful in-
centive to encourage a debtor's repayment of unpaid debts with-
out resorting to court-sanctioned collection remedies, and to set-
tle any law suits that are brought.
Perhaps more than the creditors who pursue their individ-
ual collection remedies, debtors also suffer from the loss of value
that inevitably results from pursuit of the state law remedies of
attachment, levy and garnishment. 213 Attachment can close
down a debtor's business or render an individual virtually penni-
less. Creditors know this and often threaten to pursue these
remedies solely to intimidate the debtor into payment.214
This reliance on strong-arm negotiation tactics210 will in-
Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868
(1988).
2-- 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
210 See Leff, supra note 166, at 8; Whitford, supra note 166, at 1053, 1097.
211 See I.R.C. § 166 (1988).
212 See, e.g., Leff, supra note 166, at 9, 10-11; Whitford, supra note 166, at 1055.
2 See Leff, supra note 166, at 14-18; Whitford, supra note 166, at 1054, 1058-60,
1096-99.
2" See Leff, supra note 166, at 17-18; LoPucki, supra note 10, at 355; Whitford,
supra note 166, at 1098-99.
2"I Not all negotiated resolutions of a debtor's financial distress involve "strong-
arm" tactics. Debtors frequently request, and their lenders often acquiesce, in an amica-
ble resolution of such difficulties. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 40, at 138-40; Daniel
M. Morris, Eight Steps to a Successful Workout, Bus. CaEorr, Mar. 1988, at 20. More-
over, professional credit counselors and workout specialists exist to help the parties
reach a negotiated repayment plan. Creditors may request or insist on the participation
of a credit counsellor or workout specialist. See, e.g., Gary J. Sbona & William R.
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crease if the debtor's assets are protected from the reach of un-
secured creditors. If an individual debtor's most valuable assets
are exempt or held as entireties property, or if either an individ-
ual or business debtor has granted a blanket lien against its
most valuable assets, a general unsecured creditor will have little
to gain from court-sanctioned methods of collection, including
the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.216 Threats are
all that it has to coerce repayment.217
In addition, forceful requests may be all that a creditor
needs to persuade the debtor to repay. Studies show that a com-
mon cause for the delinquency of an individual debtor is a tem-
porary interruption in disposable income, either as a result of
the loss of a job or the occurrence of an unusual major ex-
pense. 218 Although there is no single empirical explanation for
Krehbiel, Creditor-Supported Workouts, Bus. CREDIT, Mar. 1988, at 48. In the case of
individual debtors, however, some state legislatures view creditor involvement with
credit counselors as potentially subject to abuse and collusion and have regulated the
area. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 727 (1963) (upholding constitutionality of
Kansas statute making it a misdemeanor for any person to engage "in the business of
debt adjusting" except as an incident to "the lawful practice of law in this state" and
reviewing other states' prohibition and regulation of credit counselling or debt-pooling).
See generally KING & COOK, supra note 40, at 591-99.
228 See text accompanying note 196 supra.
2 Aware of the frequency with which creditors rely on informal methods to force
repayment of delinquent obligations, Congress and other federal administrative agencies
restrict these practices. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2) (permitting individual debtors to avoid
nonpossessory nonpurchase money liens against certain exempt property; 15 U.S.C. §§
1692-1692o (1988) (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act); 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (1991)
(taking of nonpossessory nonpurchase money liens against "household goods" is unfair
trade practice under Federal Trade Commission Act).
21' See, e.g., DAVID CAPLOVITz & ERIC SINGLE, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF
DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 49-55, 57-64 (1974); COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A BEFORE AND AFTER LOOK, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1984); V THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, TECHNICAL STUDIES 6-9 (1973); DAVID T. STANLEY &
MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 47-49 (1971); SULLIVAN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 98-104. Of course, there a number of other variables that may fore-
shadow personal bankruptcy. See, e.g., Vincent P. Apilado et al., Personal Bankruptcies,
7 J. LEG. STUD. 371 (1978); Ramona K.Z. Heck, An Econometric Analysis of Interstate
Differences in Non-Business Bankruptcy and Chapter Thirteen Rates, 15 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 13 (1981); Peterson & Aoki, Bankruptcy Filings Before and After Implementation
of the Bankruptcy Reform Law, 36 J. ECON. & Bus. 95 (1984); Lawrence Shepard, Ac-
counting for the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcy Rates in the United States: A Prelimi-
nary Analysis of Aggregate Data (1945 -1981), 18 J. CONSUMER AFr. 213 (1984); Law-
rence Shepard, Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 27 J.L. &
ECON. 419 (1984); Aiden F. Shiers & Daniel P. Williamson, Nonbusiness Bankruptcies
and the Law: Some Empirical Results, 21 J. CONSUMER AFF. 277 (1987); Sullivan, Per-
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business failures, 21 9 seasonal cash flow problems presumably ac-
count for a fair percentage of business debtors' financial difficul-
ties. If only some of a debtor's creditors press for payment, the
debtor is likely to pay those few creditors who squawk until fi-
nances improve and all creditors can be paid in full on time. If
all of the debtor's creditors are made aware that a short-term
financial problem has caused the debtor's general delinquency, a
sensible course of action for these creditors may simply be to
negotiate a schedule for repayment and wait for the short-term
difficulty to pass.
C. Interest in Preservation of Long-Term Relationships
Creditors' preferences for extrajudicial resolution of their
payment disputes also may be explained by the relationships be-
tween debtors and creditors.22 0 When a creditor and debtor en-
joy a complex, uncertain or long-standing relationship,221 the
sonal Failures: Causes, Costs and Benefits (Monograph No. 24) (Credit Research Center,
Purdue Univ. 1982).
"9 See note 170 supra (finance theorists' bankruptcy models involve multitude of
predictive factors).
220 My reference to the "relationships" between debtors and creditors as influential
upon creditors' decisions to file an involuntary petition must be credited to the use of
this and similar terms coined by Ian Macneil, Stewart Macaulay and other relational
contracts theorists. See generally Stewart Macaulay- An Empirical View of Contract,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 465; The Standardized Contracts of United States Automobile Afanu-
facturers, in 7 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDI Op COMPARATiVE LAw cl. 3-21, at 18-34
(1974); Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 A" Soc. Ray.
55 (1963). See generally IAN R. MACNEL: THE NEW SoczAL CoN-TRAcr (1980); Relational
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Ws L Rav. 483; Values in Contract:
Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L REv. 340 (1983); Efficient Breach of Contract: Cir-
cles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982); Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations:
Its Shortfalls and The Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L Rav
1018 (1981); Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978); Elegant Mod-
els, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAw & Soc' R:v. 507
(1977); The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L REv. 691 (1974); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L REv. 589 (1974). See also William C.
Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L Ray. 545,
546, 550 (reducing relational contract theory to two basic points. (i) that contracting
takes place not at a single point in time but rather "emerges over time in the context of
ongoing relationships"; and (ii) that parties to relational contract "frequently temper
wealth maximization goals with other objectives.").
=" See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
VA. L. REv. 1089, 1091, 1092, 1099-1111 (1981):
A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing
important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such defini-
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parties will tend to resolve their disputes through negotiation,
mediation or some other informal dispute resolution mechanism,
rather than through litigation.222
This preference for informal resolution of disputes involving
relational contracts223 should be just as strong, if not stronger, in
the context of coerced repayment of delinquent obligations.22'
All collection remedies are likely to harm the profitability of the
debtor's firm 225 and (except in involuntarily commenced chapter
tive obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify uncertain
future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations
adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in ad-
vance .... [Liong-term contracts are more likely than short-term agreements
to fit this conceptualization, but temporal extension per se is not the defining
characteristic.
222 See, e.g., Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, supra note 220, at 467-68:
Contract planning and contract law, at best, stand at the margin of important
long-term continuing business relations. Business people often do not plan, ex-
hibit great care in drafting contracts, pay much attention to those that lawyers
carefully draft, or honor a legal approach to business relationships. There are
business cultures defining the risks assumed in bargains, and what should be
done when things go wrong. People perform disadvantageous contracts today
because often this gains credit that they can draw on in the future. People
often renegotiate deals that have turned out badly for one or both sides. They
recognize a range of excuses much broader than those accepted in most legal
systems.
See also, e.g., Whitford, supra note 220, at 550:
Humans are social animals and their identities (that is, self-concepts relating
to their character and place in society) are partly constituted by their relation-
ships. Not all relationships are enjoyable, and at times the parties will prefer
separation to a continued relationship. But if the relationship is an important
one, termination will inevitably entail a partial change in identity .... [A]nd
therefore is an event often carrying emotional costs well beyond the wealth
costs of establishing a new career.
See also, e.g., Gidon Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 567, 568. 598-99, 603-05, 607, 611 (1983). See generally MACNEIL, THE NEw
SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 220, at 71-117; Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment, supra
note 220, at 886-901; Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract, supra note 220, at 957-69.
22 See note 221 and accompanying text supra.
22 See, e.g., Addison Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fan-
tasy, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 833, 836:
You will search the cases in vain for many suits involving institutionalized re-
lationships; when you do find them, they are apt to have arisen in bankruptcy.
The cases that are to be found generally involve 'one shot' deals - situations
where the breaching party did not fear loss of goodwill and, in addition, the
settlement offer was too small to be tolerated or feelings were too aroused to
permit settlement on any basis.
22 See, e.g., Sutton & Callahan, The Stigma of Bankruptcy: Spoiled Organizational
Image and Its Management, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 405 (1987).
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11 cases) often result, at least by the conclusion of the proceed-
ing, in the cessation of the business. 26 Moreover, these remedies
are likely to impact upon an individual's earning capacity. Thus
a creditor with a long-term, or otherwise important, relationship
with the debtor, contractual or otherwise, is less likely to coerce
repayment through a collective rather than an individual rem-
edy, and is less likely to coerce repayment through a court-sanc-
tioned collection remedy than through negotiation.
While creditor inhibitions may disappear as the creditor de-
termines that the debtor's earning capacity is no longer viable,
the relationship between a creditor and debtor may cause the
creditor to delay bringing a collective proceeding until the
debtor's financial failure is certain, rather than feared. More-
over, if a relational contract extends not only between the credi-
tor and a failing debtor, but also among the creditor and other
entities related financially to the failing debtor, the creditor may
decide that avoiding the harmful effect that the collective action
could have on its relationship with the related entities is more
important than collection of its obligation.
Finally, if a relational creditor 227 determines that the debtor
should file a reorganization petition in order to preserve its busi-
ness or financial affairs, the relational creditor may be in a posi-
tion to prevail upon the debtor to initiate its own reorganization
case, rather than force the debtor into reorganization by filing an
involuntary petition. To compound this preference for out-of-
court workouts, not only may the relational creditor be reluctant
to disrupt the relationship by commencing a collection remedy,
but also the debtor may be motivated to preserve important re-
lationships by preventing the default in the first place and
"working out" any default or dispute that does arise with the
relational creditor.228 "Working things out" can mean preferen-
226 See text accompanying notes 202-03 supra. Macaulay makes a similar point with
regard to contract law generally when he notes that- "There are relatively few contracts
cases litigated, and .... [w]hen final judgments are won, often they cannot be executed
because of insolvency." Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, supra note 220, at
468.
'n By "relational creditor" I mean a creditor who is a party to a relational contract.
See note 221 supra.
=8 See, e.g., Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, supra note 220, at 469
("Power, exploitation, and dependence also are significant. Continuing relationships are
not necessarily nice. The value of arrangements locks some people into dependent posi-
tions .... Seemingly independent actors may have little real freedom and discretion in
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tially paying the creditor, granting additional encumbrances to
the creditor's favor, or providing it with nonpecuniary insol-
vency protections, such as a long-term contract that the debtor
can assume in the event a bankruptcy filing occurs.229
III. SOME PROPOSED REFORMS
Congress intended for petitioning creditors to be able to
prove the standard for commencement of an involuntary case
with the sorts of evidence available to the general public, to dis-
courage creditors from filing involuntary petitions in bad faith,
and to promote a negotiated resolution of a debtor's financial
difficulties. The current standard falls short of realizing these
goals and could be improved. First, the 1984 amendment to sec-
tion 303(h) should be repealed, although the companion amend-
ment to section 303(b) should be retained. In addition, creditors'
grounds for commencement of an involuntary case should be ex-
panded to include external indicators of the debtor's financial
distress other than a debtor's general default and the appoint-
ment of a custodian for the debtor's property.230
A. Repeal of the 1984 Amendment to Section 303(h)
The current standard for commencement of an involuntary
case excludes disputed debts from the calculation of whether the
debtor is in general default if the debtor shows that its dispute
involves either a genuine issue of material fact or a substantial
question of law. Moreover, if the debtor can establish a bona fide
dispute as to the claims of any of its petitioning creditors, those
creditors will not have standing to file a petition and, unless suf-
ficient additional creditors with standing can be convinced to
join in the petition, an order for relief will not be entered. By
requiring petitioning creditors to show both that their own
claims are not subject to bona fide disputes raised by the debtor
light of the costs of offending dominant parties.").
229 See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 10, at 333-35.
230 The proposed changes are intended neither to encourage creditors to file more
involuntary petitions nor discourage creditors from forcing a debtor into bankruptcy.
Instead, they recognize that the standard for commencement is only one factor consid-
ered by creditors when deciding how best to coerce repayment of an unpaid obligation,
and that many creditors successfully collect delinquent debts without resort to the bank.
ruptcy court or any other court.
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and that the debtor has not raised bona fide disputes as to other
creditors' claims (or at least as to enough other claims so that
calculation of whether the debtor generally has failed to pay its
debts as they come due is affected), Congress asks petitioning
creditors to prove a standard that, in part, is based on informa-
tion to which they generally will not have access.
The bona fide dispute part of the "general failure to pay"
standard was added with the 1984 amendments to the Code to
quell suspicions that creditors were filing involuntary petitions
against their debtors solely to gain negotiating leverage in settle-
ment discussions. 23' But this concern could be addressed simply
with an initial inquiry into the bona fides of disputed obligations
held by the petitioning creditors. In this way, the court would
not be required to consider the merits, even in a summary fash-
ion, of all the debtor's obligations, but only those three (or
fewer) disputed liabilities claimed by creditors that join in an
involuntary petition. Morever, since petitioning creditors would
only be required to prove that their own claims were not subject
to the debtor's bona fide dispute, they are likely to have access
to the information they need.
The standard for commencement of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy case should minimize undue negotiating leverage. Under
the current "bona fide dispute" standard financially distressed
debtors may feel it is in their best interest to litigate disputed
claims, rather than reach a negotiated resolution of the dispute,
in order to support their claim that the dispute is bona fide
should an involuntary petition later be commenced because
courts are more likely to find that a bona fide dispute exists if
litigation is pending.232 In addition, the current standard may
compel debtors to "pay off" all creditors whose claims they only
partially dispute233 because courts have tended not to find that a
bona fide dispute exists for purposes of this standard when a
debtor merely disputes the amount of debt rather than the fact
of liability.234 If courts were to scrutinize only the bona fides of a
debtor's dispute of petitioners' claims, debtors would be less apt
to rush to litigate or pay disputed claims because the tactical
23 130 CONG. REC. 17,151 (1984) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
11 See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
2" Credit for this point is due to Professor Barry Zaretsky of Brooklyn Law SchooL
2 See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
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advantage of litigating the claim in a subsequent contest over an
involuntary petition would be reduced.
B. Adding To the Grounds for Involuntary Bankruptcy
The standard for commencement of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy case should be expanded. Creditors may have difficulty
proving the "general failure to pay" standard because proof may
require information to which creditors do not have access. Ex-
panding upon the external indications of a debtor's financial dis-
tress is one easy solution to creditors' problems of proof. Thus,
the 120 day limitation should be removed from section
303(h)(2). Unpaid debts that remain following (i) a corporate or
partnership debtor's dissolution under state law, (ii) a business
debtor's cessation of business, or (iii) an individual debtor's un-
explained disappearance, should be added as rebuttable grounds
for involuntary relief. In addition, a debtor's admitted inability
to pay its debts as they come due should be rebuttable grounds
for the commencement of an involuntary case.235 Petitioning
creditors' allegations of these external events could be rebutted
by the involuntary debtor's proof that it is paying its debts as
they come due.
Creditors' problems of proof also could be resolved by ad-
ding insolvency as a rebuttable grounds for bringing an involun-
tary bankruptcy case, providing insolvency is defined in a way
that permits proof with reference to publicly available facts. As
with the other proposed grounds for relief, petitioning creditors'
proof of insolvency should be rebuttable by the debtor's proof of
its general payment of debts as they come due.238
211 The former Bankruptcy Act permitted the commencement of an involuntary
bankruptcy case based on a debtor's written admission of its inability to pay its debts as
they came due and willingness to be adjudicated a bankrupt. See text accompanying
note 42 supra. The requirement of a written admission seems unduly restrictive of a
court's prerogative as a fact finder. The requirement that the debtor not only admit its
inability to pay debts as they come due, but also waive in writing prior to the filing its
right to contest a creditors' petition, seems only to provide a means for debtors with
public filing requirements to fulfill their need to disclose material financial information
(i.e., their inability to pay debts as they come due) without providing creditors the am-
munition for an involuntary petition.
23. Insolvency should constitute only rebuttable grounds for the commencement of
an involuntary case. When an insolvent debtor is able to repay its obligations out of
current earnings, creditors' interests are satisfied, without the need for involuntary bank-
ruptcy, because these interests are triggered only after a debtor's default. Although the
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The suggestion that other external indications of a debtor's
financial difficulties be included among the criteria for com-
mencement of an involuntary case is not a novel one. Treiman
and MacLachlan made similar proposals long before enactment
of the Code.237 The foreign laws from which they drew support
similarly permit the commencement of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy case based upon proof of these sorts of events.3 8
debtor is balance sheet insolvent, this insolvency does not present the need for any sort
of collection remedy, whether individual or collective, because the debtor has not de-
faulted on its obligations. See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 325:
[Tihe desirability of continued operation does not depend upon the business
being profitable or able to pay its debts as they become due; nor does it de-
pend in any degree upon the amount of debt the business owes or the relation-
ship between the amount of debt and the value of assets. Under some circum-
stances, it may be desireable to permit and encourage the continued operation
of an insolvent, unprofitable business.
But see THomAs H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LMIrrs OF BANiKRuCv" LAw 200 (198)
(criticizing current "general failure to pay" standard because it does not permit com-
mencement of bankruptcy case against insolvent debtor able to pay debts as they come
due, and using Johns-Manville as example of insolvent debtor that was appropriate can-
didate for bankruptcy, although able to pay debts as they came due). Admittedly, adding
insolvency as a rebuttable grounds for bringing an involuntary bankruptcy case merely
shifts the burden of proving general default from creditors to the debtor. But the shift is
appropriate, because debtors have access to the financial records necessary to establish
their general payment whereas creditors often do not. See text accompanying notes 163-
85 supra.
23 MAcLACHLAN, supra note 24, at 58-60 (recommending retention of general as-
signment for benefit of creditors, and admission of inability to pay debts coupled with
declaration of willingness to be adjudged bankrupt, as conclusive grounds for commence-
ment of involuntary case; recommending proof of absconding or general stoppage of pay-
ments as rebuttable grounds for commencement of involuntary case); Treiman, supra
note 45, at 211-15 (recommending retention of assignment for benefit of creditors, unsat-
isfied liens obtained through legal proceedings, receiverships, recent admissions of inabil-
ity to pay debts as they come due, and other conduct and events as presumptive of
debtor's inability to pay debts as they come due).
2 See, e.g., Canadian Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. §§ 24, 25 (permitting one or more
creditors to file involuntary bankruptcy petition if (i) debt owed petitioner is $1,000 or
more and (ii) if debtor has committed one of ten possible acts of bankruptcy within 6
months before filing;, acts of bankruptcy defined as (1) assignment of property to trustee
for benefit of creditors generally;, (2) fraudulent conveyance; (3) fraudulent preference;
(4) departure from, or remainder outside, boundaries of Canada, with intent to defeat or
delay creditors; (5) "keeping to house" with intent to defeat or delay creditors; (6) as-
signment, removal, secretion or disposal of assets, with intent to defeat or delay credi-
tors; (7) permitting execution under which property is seized to remain unsatisfied until
within 4 days before date fixed for sale, or for 14 days after seizure by sheriff, or permit-
ting sheriff to sell goods is satisfaction of judgment lien; (8) written admission of inabil-
ity to pay debts as they come due; (9) notice to creditors of suspension of payments; (10)




On the other hand, the notion that insolvency should be
among the standards for commencement of involuntary cases
will undoubtedly be viewed, at first blush, as a jurisprudential
step backward, since, in 1978, Congress abolished the "acts of
bankruptcy" expressly because the "acts" often required elusive
proof of a debtor's insolvency.239 Nonetheless, insolvency should
be added to the grounds for thrusting a debtor into bankruptcy
because, if properly defined, in some cases it may actually be
easier for creditors to prove a debtor's insolvency than its gen-
eral default.
Generally speaking, balance sheet insolvency describes a
debtor's internal financial condition that requires extensive ex-
amination and valuation to diagnose. A debtor's general failure
to pay describes both an internal financial condition and its ex-
ternal manifestations. 240 Because a debtor's general failure to
pay its debts as they come due is an external event, it should be
easier for creditors to prove than the internal financial situation
of insolvency it manifests. But creditors may be unable to gain
access to information that would show by a preponderance of
the evidence that a debtor has generally failed to pay its debts
as they come due.24' Moreover, a debtor's general cessation of
payment is not the only way in which a debtor's financial dis-
tress manifests itself. 242 Thus the involuntary bankruptcy stan-
dard should permit creditors to commence a case upon proof of
any external manifestation of the internal financial condition of
insolvency.
This suggestion that insolvency be added to the grounds for
commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case depends
upon being able to propose a definition of insolvency that is con-
sistent with creditors' goals for involuntary bankruptcy. In addi-
tion, insolvency should be easy for creditors to establish on the
basis of information that is publicly available or otherwise easily
accessible.
Historically, balance sheet insolvency has been criticized as
difficult to prove. Commentators criticized ambiguities in the
statutory definition of the term under the former Bankruptcy
239 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 14, 187-88.
20 Treiman, supra note 45, at 211-15.
241 See text accompanying notes 163-85 supra.
242 See text accompanying notes 189-91 supra.
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Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act:24 3 What as-
sets and liabilities were to be included in creating this hypothet-
ical balance sheet comparison? 2" What assumptions were to be
made about the conditions surrounding the hypothetical liquida-
tion of the debtor's assets and payment of the debtor's liabili-
ties?245 Others generally criticized the difficulty of proving an in-
ternal financial condition based on creditors' limited access to
financial records.246
With its enactment of the Code, Congress refined the defini-
tion of "insolvency" to clarify the types of assets and liabilities
includible in the determination of whether a debtor's assets are
sufficient to repay its liabilities. 2 1 Presently the Code defines
"insolvent" as the financial condition that exists when "the sum
of [the debtor's] debts is greater than all of [the debtor's] prop-
erty, at fair valuation," excluding fraudulently transferred and
exempt property.248
2,1 See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
2" See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
2,See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
2 6 See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
2"' The Code still does not resolve the assumptions a court is to make in valuing a
debtor's assets and liabilities. The Code states only that a debtor's assets are to be mea-
sured "at a fair valuation," 11 U.S.C. § 101(31), the same standard as under the former
Act. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra. The Code provides a single definition of
insolvency applicable to several very different circumstances-to determine when the
debtor's payment of antecedent debts is preferential, see 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3), (0, when
transfers by the debtor are constructively fraudulent to its creditors, see id. §
548(a)(2)(B)(i), and when the absolute priority rule should be enforced in a reorganiza-
tion case because the debtor's equity interests are valueless, see id. § 1129(b)(2)(C). See
also Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AN. BANKm L.J. 133 (1979). As a result, the Code's definition
of insolvency still is difficult to apply because it does not tell the court how to measure
the value of the debtor's assets and liabilities. Some methods of measuring the value of
the debtor's assets and liabilities are more appropriate for certain circumstances than
others, and if the Code were to prescribe a single measure for valuation, it could not
provide a single definition of insolvency applicable throughout the Code. For example, a
going concern valuation of the debtor's assets may be more appropriate when the court is
seeking to determine whether the debtor's common stock should be deemed valueless in
a reorganization plan due to the debtor's insolvency, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C),
whereas a liquidation value may be more appropriate in determining whether a transfer
by the debtor should be deemed constructively fraudulent either because it depleted the
debtor's insolvent estate, or caused the solvent debtor to become insolvent, see id. §
548(a)(2)(B)(i).
214 Id. § 101(31). When the debtor is a partnership, "insolvency" instead is defined
as the financial condition that exists when "the sum of such partnership's debts is
greater than the aggregate of... all of such partnership's property, exclusive of [fraudu-
1991)
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)2"9 improves
somewhat on the Code's definition of insolvency.2 50 Reminiscent
of the Code,25' the UFTA defines "insolvency" in terms of the
financial condition of a debtor and provides that "[a] debtor is
insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of
the debtor's assets." '252 The UFTA is, however, more specific
than the Code about the types of assets and liabilities that
should be counted on each side of a debtor/transferee's balance
sheet. Like the Code, the UFTA excludes exempt 253 and fraudu-
lently transferred assets.254 The UFTA goes even further than
the Code and excludes "property held in tenancy by the entire-
ties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor hold-
ing a claim against only one tenant, ' 255 and encumbered prop-
erty,25 from inclusion on the asset side of balance sheet
insolvency.
In addition, the UF.TA attempts to resolve creditors' evi-
dentiary problems associated with proving a debtor's insolvency
in ways that the Code does not. First, the UFTA provides that
lently transferred property], and the sum of the excess of the value of each general part-
ner's non-partnership property, exclusive of . . . [exempt and fraudulently transferred
property], over such partner's non-partnership debts." Id. § 101(31)(B). When the
debtor is a municipality, another definition of insolvency applies. See id. § 101(31)(C).
And when an individual debtor resides in a state that recognizes community property
rights, the definition of the asset side of the balance sheet, for purposes of determining
the debtor's insolvency, will differ somewhat. See id. § 541(a)(2).
-49 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985). See generally Michael L. Cook & Richard E. Mendales,
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 Am. BANKH. L.J. 87
(1988); Frank R. Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 195
(1986).
250 Unlike the Code definition, the UFTA definition of insolvency relates only to the
question of whether a transfer by the debtor should be deemed constructively fraudulent
because it depleted an insolvent debtor's insolvent estate, or because it rendered a sol-
vent debtor insolvent. UFTA § 5. Nonetheless, UFTA is no clearer than the Code in its
standard of valuation. Like the Code, UFTA specifies only that a debtor's insolvency is
to be calculated by comparing the debtor's debts to its assets "at a fair valuation." Id. §
2(a).
.. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A).
22 UFTA § 2(a). See also id. § 2(b) (definition of insolvency as applied to partner-
ship debtor).
-53 Id. § 1(2)(ii).
2" Id. § 2(d).
255 Id. § 1(2)(iii).
256 Id. § 1(2)(i). UFTA broadly defines property as encumbered by a "lien" if sub-
ject, not only to consensual security interests, but also to involuntary liens such as judg-
ment liens, execution liens and mechanics' liens. Id. § 1(8).
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"[a] debtor who is generally not paying his [or her] debts as they
become due is presumed to be insolvent. '20 7 It also effectively
incorporates a presumption of insolvency upon proof that a
debtor's assets are fully encumbered by excluding both encum-
bered assets258 and secured liabilities 29 from the calculation of
insolvency.
How should "insolvency" be defined under the Code if it
were to be added to the grounds for commencement of an invol-
untary bankruptcy case? The current balance sheet definition of
insolvency should be retained under the Code, with some refine-
ments, including the improvements made to the definition under
the UFTA. Specifically, all of the debtor's property that is sub-
ject to the state law remedy of execution should be included on
the asset side of this balance sheet. Thus, exempt assets should
be excluded,2 0 as well as assets held by the debtor as a tenant
by the entireties unless the debtor's interest in such property is
subject to process by an individual, as distinct from a joint,
creditor of the debtor under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 1
Assets fraudulently transferred to the debtor also should not be
counted among the debtor's assets.6 2 Similarly, assets that are
subject to a valid lien2 11 should also be excluded from this bal-
ance sheet 2 " because general unsecured creditors can levy
against only the debtor's equity in encumbered property.
To be fair, secured indebtedness, 2 5 indebtedness protected
217 Id. § 2(b).
25 Id. § 1(2)(i).
2 9 Id. § 2(e).
.8. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(ii) (exempt assets excluded from asset side of insol-
vency balance sheet); UFTA § 1(2)(ii) (definition of "asset" excludes exempt property).
See also id. § 2 cmt. 1.
281 See id. § 1(2)(iii) (definition of asset excludes "an interest in property held in
tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a
claim against only one tenant"). See also id. § 2 cmt. 1.
282 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(i); UFTA § 2(d).
282 The standard would also incorporate the UFTA's broad definition of "lien." See
id. § 1(8). See also note 256 supra. As such, the proposed standard is reminiscent of the
former third act of bankruptcy, which permitted commencement of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy case upon proof that the debtor had allowed a judicial lien to remain unsatisfied
for a period of time. See text accompanying note 39 supra. See also AhicLmHAN, supra
note 24, at 60-62 (recommending that debtor's failure to satisfy judicial liens be retained
as prima facie evidence of its general inability to pay debts as they come due).
284 See UFTA § 1(2)(i) (definition of asset excludes property encumbered by valid
lien). See also id. § 2 cmt. 1.
21 "Secured indebtedness" should be as broadly defined as the term "lien." Thus it
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by a valid waiver of exemption, and obligations jointly incurred
by an individual debtor and his or her spouse should be ex-
cluded from the liability side of this balance sheet.266 Contingent
and unliquidated liabilities should be assigned liquidated pre-
sent values based on reasonable predictions of the debtor's ac-
tual liability. Assets should be assigned a "fair valuation" by ref-
erence to an estimate of the proceeds that would be received in a
hypothetical actual liquidation of the property.
This definition of insolvency addresses creditors' problem of
proof because insolvency is defined in a way to permit creditors
to establish their debtor's insolvency based upon readily availa-
ble information. In practical result, the definition raises a rebut-
table presumption of insolvency upon proof that all or substan-
tially all of a debtor's assets are beyond the reach of its general
unsecured creditors, either because the assets are subject to a
blanket lien, held as a tenant by the entireties, or otherwise ex-
empt, and that the debtor has unsecured liabilities.0 7 Creditors
should enjoy easy access to this information by reference to ap-
plicable laws relevant to exemptions and entireties property and
by searching public filings.
One trouble with this definition is that it may make the
standard for commencement of an involuntary case too easy to
establish since many debtors have few nonexempt or unencum-
bered assets, but the proposed standard would protect against
abusive petitions in two ways. First, the proposed standard pro-
vides only presumptive grounds for entry of an order for relief.
Debtors would be able to rebut the showing of insolvency with
proof of their general payment of debts as they come due, and
should have easy access to this proof. Second, petitioning credi-
tors would still be subject to the overarching requirement that
they act in good faith when filing an involuntary petition.20 8
Creditors who join in an involuntary petition grounded on a
debtor's insolvency should in good faith believe that the debtor
has failed to pay its current obligations as they mature, or suffer
should include indebtedness secured both by voluntary and involuntary liens. See note
256 supra.
211 See UFTA § 2(e); id. § 2 cmt. 5.
267 Although such a presumption is not made explicit by the UFTA, its exclusion of
exempt property, collateral and property held as a tenant by the entireties accomplishes
the same result. See id. § 1(2).
2 See notes 131-51 and accompanying text supra.
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the sanctions that can follow from the filing of an involuntary
petition in bad faith.269 Finally, courts should strive to ensure
that debtors who are successful in procuring a dismissal of an
involuntary petition grounded on insolvency are compensated
both for the costs incurred by them in fighting the petition and
the losses caused by the filing.270
CONCLUSION
From July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1988, creditors filed 1,409 in-
voluntary bankruptcy petitions against their debtors.27' Whether
this number is viewed as too small depends upon which of Con-
gress's purposes in amending the statute governing involuntary
bankruptcy is considered. The number might have been greater
had Congress succeeded in its effort to make proof of the stan-
dard for commencement of an involuntary case dependent solely
upon publicly available information. In addition, more creditors
might have filed involuntary petitions had Congress sought to
encourage creditors to file earlier in a debtor's financial crisis
through a more effective means than liberalization of the stan-
dard for commencement, such as through a bounty system that
rewards petitioning creditors for successfully obtaining the entry
of an order for relief against their debtor." 2 By contrast, the
number can be viewed as about right when considered in light of
Congress's goal to encourage creditors to resolve a debtor's fi-
nancial difficulties outside of bankruptcy when a nonbankruptcy
solution can be accomplished more quickly, less expensively and
with less disruption than would have occurred in an involuntary
case.
The difficulty in assessing whether creditors file too few in-
voluntary petitions is that two of these three goals are inconsis-
tent. It is possible to streamline proof of the standard for com-
2"9 The possibility that an involuntary filing grounded on the debtor's insolvency
would be filed in bad faith is strongest in the case of an individual debtor. However,
absent fraud or the like, creditors have little rational reason to thrust an individual
debtor into bankruptcy due to the Bankruptcy Code's policy to provide individuals with
a "fresh start." See text accompanying notes 205-09 supra. Thus the presumption of a
debtor's inability to pay debts as they mature from proof of insolvency perhaps should
be applied only to nonindividual debtors.
-0 11 U.S.C. § 303(i).
I" See note 14 supra.
2"2 See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 365.
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mencement of an involuntary case and encourage creditors to
file petitions earlier in a debtor's financial troubles, but realiza-
tion of these goals is inconsistent with the notion that nonban-
kruptcy options should be exhausted before an involuntary peti-
tion is filed. It is possible to improve the standard for
commencement and encourage creditors to reach a consensus
about the debtor's difficulties, but accomplishing these goals
may preclude efforts to encourage creditors to file earlier and
more often in the face of a debtor's insolvency or default.
Creditors' preferences for resolution of their debtor's finan-
cial troubles without litigation are both strong and appropriate.
As a result, it would be undesireable to change the statute gov-
erning commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case to en-
courage creditors to shortcut these consensual efforts. Congress
should seek to increase dividends to creditors from bankruptcy
estates in some other way.
INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS
APPENDIX A
BANKRUPTcY STATISTICS TABLE 1970-88
Chap. X,
Chap. XI
Year Total Total % 7 % or 11 %
































































































































0 TOTAL INVOLUNTARY 0 CHAPTER 7 * CHAPTER X, XI (Act), & 11 (Cc
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: 803













INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCIES PER YEAR
zo
0
